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Current History

Vol. 34

JUNE, 1958

No. 202

The British community faces the nuclear age from a position of some unity throughout the Commonwealth, but serious tensions remain, particularly in Cyprus, South Africa, Malaya, India and Pakistan and the East-Central African regions. In Britain itself, as this able introduction makes it clear, misunderstanding with the United States has been resolved, "but during the last few months a new situation of great difficulty and complexity has confronted British foreign policy, arising out of Britain's peculiar vulnerability in an era of nuclear armaments."

Britain in the Nuclear Age

BY G. F. HUDSON

Director, Centre of Far Eastern Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford University

THE Second World War changed the international position of Britain far more fundamentally than the First. The British experience in 1945 was similar to that of 1918 in that on each occasion the British nation emerged victorious with the United States and France as allies from a prolonged war against Germany. But in 1918 there was a general belief—which in retrospect we can see to have been illusory, but was then plausible enough—that victory would mean a return to the conditions of the pre-war era, or rather to the period before the growth of German military and naval power had compelled Britain to abandon “splendid isolation.”

Bismarck’s Germany had been democratized and disarmed, the Russia of the Tsars had dissolved in revolution and civil war; there was no longer any over-mighty nation threatening a military domination of Europe. The British Empire had survived the war intact and the British economy, though severely strained by the struggle, still appeared to be in a position of great strength. The basic British policy was to disengage as far as possible from the affairs of Europe and to revert to what the Conservatives called “tranquillity”; it was an

aspiration parallel to the American post-war return to isolationism and the “normalcy” of President Harding.

In 1945, on the other hand, it was evident to most well-informed people, including the leaders of the two major political parties, that Britain was faced with a new, and indeed entirely unprecedented, situation in the field of foreign relations. Instead of a restoration of the balance of power in Europe there was now a power vacuum in the heart of the continent and an enormous preponderance of military strength in the hands of a despotic government whose hostility had already aroused grave apprehensions among British statesmen even before the death of Hitler. It soon became clear that Europe no longer had the capacity from its own resources to preserve an order of national independence and political liberty without the permanent active support of the United States.

Further, the British economy had this time been so shattered by the war that its recovery was dependent on American financial aid; the British people for the first time were reduced to living under a system of tight currency restrictions and “dollar earnings” came to have a significance which

would have been unimaginable to an earlier generation. Both on strategic and on economic grounds therefore Britain was aware of a need for friendship and cooperation with the United States such as had not existed in 1918, and its whole foreign policy had to be realigned accordingly.

Finally, Britain was faced with new critical developments in her dependent territories and imperial spheres of influence in Asia and Africa. The movements of political and economic nationalism which had been merely incipient in 1918 had now become a mighty force which was reversing the whole trend of history represented by the colonial empires of Western nations in the Orient. The British Far Eastern territories overrun by the Japanese—Burma, Malaya, Hongkong—were recovered at the end of the war, but within three years sovereign power had been transferred into Asian hands in Delhi, Karachi, Colombo and Rangoon, and soon a great upheaval in the Middle East was threatening not only the British protectorates in Arabia but also the oil supplies on which British industry had come to depend and the maritime communications through the Suez Canal which Britain had long regarded as her most vital overseas interest.

Primary Aims

In the endeavour to adapt her foreign policy to the conditions of this new world, Britain has pursued three principal aims. First and foremost—since her very national existence depends on it—to obtain security against the threat of a Russian domination of Europe; second, to preserve special political and economic ties with former territories of the British Empire which have become independent nations, including both the older European-settled "Dominions" and the newer Asian and African states; and third, to keep open wherever possible channels of international trade and to maintain access to sources of supply of industrially essential commodities, particularly oil.

The second and third of these purposes have to some extent run counter to the first, inasmuch as they have been adverse to schemes for European union which would

integrate Britain with the neighbouring continent at the expense of the worldwide associations and interests derived from four centuries of maritime expansion in insular detachment from Europe. In 1945, British statesmen were certainly aware that their destinies were bound up with those of continental nations more than ever before; although the Channel had still been an effective barrier to invasion in 1940, five years of bombs and rockets on London had impressed deeply on the British mind the country's new vulnerability to any hostile power established in Western Europe. But in seeking a security for the future against the danger which had replaced Hitler, British diplomacy no longer relied on any merely European coalition but concentrated on building up in time of peace an alliance with the United States.

The primary considerations in this course of policy were strategic; it was evident that, with Germany disarmed and dismembered and all Eastern Europe swept into the Russian orbit, there was not enough strength left in the western margins of the continent to sustain a "third force" between North America and the Soviet Union. But over and above the need for American support to keep Western Europe from falling under the hegemony of Moscow there was a perception that the wider Atlantic Union was more compatible with British overseas interests and the continued existence of the British Commonwealth than any restricted integration with Europe would be. The grouping of nations which emerged as Nato included Canada, was acceptable to Australia and New Zealand, and left Britain relatively free to frame policies suitable to an economy more dependent on seaborne foreign trade than that of any of her continental neighbours.

The alliance of Britain with the United States is now so much taken for granted that it is difficult to realize how great were the obstacles to it at the outset. American isolationism was still powerful when President Roosevelt intended to withdraw American troops from Europe immediately after the end of the war, and influential circles in Washington held that any support of Britain against Russia meant underwriting British

colonialism; in London, on the other hand, the general election of 1945 brought in a parliamentary majority widely imbued with the idea that a socialist Britain should have nothing to do with capitalist America. Anti-British Americans and anti-American Britons, however, usually had one thing in common—a partiality for the Soviet Union, and their respective attitudes, so useful to Moscow, were encouraged by appropriate Communist propaganda in each country.

Fortunately, however, the two governments were persuaded by Soviet actions during the three years following the end of the war that a common front was necessary to check the further expansion of Stalin's new empire. The threats to Turkey, the international Communist support for the insurrection in Greece, the Communist *coup* in Czechoslovakia and blockade of Berlin—these and other manifestations of Soviet policy brought about the defensive coalition of Western Europe and North America which came to be known by the significant title of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Outside Europe, Britain has participated since the war in two coalitions of states designed to contain the Communist bloc within existing limits. One is the Baghdad Pact, barring an advance of Soviet power into the Middle East, and the other is Seato, intended to thwart a southward expansion of Communist China into Southeast Asia. Apart from the general aim of preventing satellitization of the independent, but often weak and unstable countries of these areas, the pacts have from a British point of view the objective of providing security for important economic investments and sources of supply in Asia—the oil of Iraq and Kuwait and the rubber and tin of Malaya, control of which by the Communist bloc would be a very heavy blow to the British economy.

But resistance to Communist expansion in the Middle East and Southeast Asia involves problems of a kind quite different from those which have to be faced in Europe. In Europe the majority of the non-Communist states freely joined Nato, while those which for various special reasons remained neutral—Sweden, Finland, Switzerland and Austria—were all strongly sympathetic to the cause

of the West, and the first three of them at least were capable of offering a vigorous resistance to any violations of their neutrality. Nor was Europe west of the Soviet orbit divided by any deep unreconciled conflicts; indeed by 1950 it had attained an unprecedented degree of regional solidarity.

In Asia, on the other hand, the nations willing to join with Western powers in containing communism were outnumbered by others which remained neutral and in some cases showed inclinations towards Moscow or Peking in their foreign policies. Moreover, the two most important of these neutrals, India and Egypt, were not content to claim their own sovereign rights of non-involvement, but bitterly attacked the Baghdad and Seato pacts as interferences by Western imperialism in Asian affairs breaking up what would otherwise be "areas of peace."

These antagonisms in fact reflected neither Marxist-Leninist convictions nor a disinterested concern for peace, but fierce conflicts between Asian countries—the enmities of India for Pakistan, of Egypt for Iraq, and of the Arabs generally for Israel. The Western powers, though desiring only to build up systems of defence against possible Russian or Chinese aggression, found themselves involved willy-nilly in the local conflicts of Asia, and for Britain the situation was particularly embarrassing because India and Pakistan had both remained members of the Commonwealth.

British-American Differences

Britain and the United States both have the same common interest in containing Soviet power in the Middle and Far East that they have in Europe, but for various reasons their policies have been much less harmonious outside Europe than within the geographical field of Nato. The clashes of policy have found the two Western powers confronted differently in the Middle and the Far East. In the Far East, Britain has tended to conciliate Communist China, has repudiated the residual Nationalist regime in Formosa and during the Korean war strongly opposed any move to counter the Chinese intervention by direct action against

China itself; Britain has continually favoured a policy towards Peking less tough than the American.

In the Middle East, on the other hand, it is Britain that has pursued the tougher policy towards Nasser's Egypt; the United States pressed for the evacuation of British forces from the Suez Canal zone, was lukewarm towards British efforts to create an international authority for the Canal after Nasser's nationalization of it, and finally came out in uncompromising opposition to the Anglo-French action against Egypt in the autumn of 1956. As a result of these divergencies of policy there have been serious mutual resentments between sections of British and American opinion; over China, Britain has been accused in America of appeasement and double-dealing, and similar reproaches have been thrown back at the United States from Britain over Egypt.

Britain's Disengagement

In retrospect, it is evident that these dis cords over Middle and Far Eastern policies have corresponded to basic differences of approach conditioned by historical circumstances. Since 1945, or rather ever since 1937, when the Japanese army was let loose upon China, the contraction of effective British power caused Britain virtually to write off the political influence in the Far East which had been so important a factor in world affairs at the beginning of the century. Britain carried out a kind of disengagement from the Far East beyond Singapore, and particularly from the politics of China, hoping merely to preserve old trading connections with whatever regime was established there.

The United States, on the other hand, became more and more deeply involved in the Far East as the British withdrew; China during the Pacific war was recognized as an American "strategic sphere" and afterwards the United States undertook responsibility for the military occupation of Japan and South Korea as well as for the repatriation of the Japanese forces from China. A vast American commitment was created and the very fact that the confusions of American policy in the period immediately after the

war undoubtedly contributed to the advance of communism on the East Asian mainland only made it more necessary for the Truman Administration to take strong action to defend what could still be saved when the disastrous consequences of previous mistakes became apparent.

Thus the American government became the protector of Chiang Kai-shek in his island refuge while the British government tried to salvage British commercial interests in China by diplomatic recognition of the Communist regime and indulged in wishful speculations on the prospects of Mao Tsetung becoming a second Tito. Britain took part in the United Nations action in Korea, but there was extreme reluctance to become involved in an armed conflict with China, and it was largely British objections—supported by other European nations participating in the Korean war—which dissuaded the United States from the strategic bombing of Chinese airfields, ports and communications as a part of war operations.

In the Middle East, by contrast, Britain remained deeply involved strategically and politically while the United States had still as late as 1956 no major national interest except the economic stake in Saudi Arabian oil. The traditional British imperial interest was centered on Suez, the vital link—successfully defended in two world wars—in the short sea route to India, Singapore, Australia and Hongkong. With the termination of British sovereignty in the Indian sub-continent the Canal lost something of its old importance, but the unobstructed access to the Indian Ocean by the short route was still felt to be a vital economic and strategic need, particularly in view of the increasing dependence of Britain, and of all Western Europe, on the Middle Eastern oil.

For this reason the section of the Conservative party known as the Suez group bitterly opposed Sir Anthony's willingness to evacuate British forces from the Canal Zone without any guarantees against future misuse of controls of the Canal by Egypt. Eden believed that he could gain the good will of the Nasser regime by renouncing the last restriction on Egyptian national sovereignty; when the sequel to the departure of British troops was not an improvement

of relations but a new unfolding of Pan-Arab ambitions under Soviet patronage and an intensification of anti-British propaganda, Eden had no answer to his Right-wing critics and was later drawn into the disastrous attempt to recover what he had given away, first by a demonstration of force and then, when that produced no effect, by the actual use of force.

Eden, however, gravely underestimated the international complications of the action against Egypt, and a great part of British public opinion was shocked at a military expedition with so inadequate a *casus belli*. Even those who held that something must be done about the Canal blamed Eden for his recklessness and were embarrassed by the plain violation of the United Nations Charter. There was nevertheless a deep and widespread feeling that Britain had suffered a great national disaster and that the American attitude throughout the whole period of tension with Egypt had been unhelpful and equivocal.

Rapprochement

Diplomacy has worked from both sides, and on the whole successfully, to repair the damage done to Anglo-American relations by the Far Eastern and Middle Eastern crises, so that today neither Suez nor Formosa remains a burning issue between London and Washington. With regard to China, Britain has reluctantly acquiesced in the American policy of keeping the Peking government out of the United Nations and has approved the American undertaking to defend Formosa against an invasion from the mainland; with the conclusion of the Manila treaty Britain and the United States have assumed a joint obligation to defend Thailand—and thus also the approaches to Malaya—against an attack from China. In the Middle East, the United States by the proclamation of the Eisenhower Doctrine has assumed a new responsibility—and incurred a corresponding unpopularity with the Pan-Arab extremists—for opposing Soviet-inspired disturbances in the Middle East, and has done everything to support and strengthen the Baghdad Pact short of actually joining it. The idea of an Anglo-

American political partnership concerned with all Communist threatened areas from Norway to Iran and from Iran to the Philippines now seems to be closer to realization than ever before.

Nuclear Vulnerability

But during the last few months a new situation of great difficulty and complexity has confronted British foreign policy, arising out of Britain's peculiar vulnerability in an era of nuclear armaments. Although the territorial positions and alignments of nations in Europe have remained virtually unchanged since the blockade of Berlin, the strategic situation has not stood still; the former American monopoly of the atomic bomb has given place first to a "nuclear stalemate," with both sides in possession of enormous destructive capacity, and now a Soviet lead in the development of the intercontinental missile. At the same time, however, the British government has finally given up any hope of Nato being able to defend Western Europe with conventional forces against a possible Soviet military invasion, and, spurred on by the need for drastic cuts in budgetary expenditure to check inflation, has decided to reduce the size of its armed forces and stake everything on nuclear weapons. It has publicly declared that a major Soviet attack, even with conventional forces only, will be met with full-scale nuclear retaliation.

But this strategic doctrine has produced widespread alarm and dismay on the British home front, for it is realized that the small area of the country and concentration of its industrial cities would make all-out nuclear warfare infinitely more deadly than for the United States or Russia and that a policy of resorting to nuclear weapons except for retaliation in kind does not make sense from a British point of view.

The Soviet sputnik and intercontinental missile did not in reality make matters worse than before for Britain—which was already within the sphere of intermediate-range rockets as well as of piloted bombers—but it focused public attention on the whole issue of nuclear armaments. The result was a formidable popular campaign for nuclear dis-

armament and strong pressure on the government for compliance with Khrushchev's demand for a summit conference and for an agreement with Russia on almost any terms. Alarm inspired by the boasts and threats of Soviet leaders since last August has mingled with a renewal of wishful optimism about Moscow's supposed desire for a settlement of differences.

The present British government is in a weak position for withstanding such a movement of popular feeling because it has for various reasons become widely unpopular, and political observers are agreed that an unsuccessful summit conference would seal its fate at the next general election, whereas any agreement with Russia, however detrimental to Western interests, would be electorally a trump card. This trend is pulling British policy away from America in the approach to fresh negotiations with Moscow, and the most skilful diplomacy will be needed during the coming months to preserve Anglo-American cooperation and prevent a disintegration of the Nato alliance.

Acute controversy is likely over specific terms which may be proposed in negotiation with Russia.

In a wider perspective, however, the main problem for Britain remains one of making the nuclear deterrent as convincing as possible while endeavouring to organize non-nuclear deterrents to a point of effectiveness which would render it superfluous. In the long run this should not be beyond Nato's capacity, for the total economic and technological resources of the West are greater than those of the Soviet bloc.

Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, from 1926 to 1954, G. F. Hudson was a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow (1932). He served several years with the British Foreign Office. An editor of The Economist, he is also author of Europe and China: Their Relations in History to 1800 and The Far East in World Politics.



"The years of Colombo Plan experience indicate increasing recognition of the need for a better balance between the public and private sectors. Throughout Free Asia private enterprise predominates in the fields of agriculture and small business. Private entrepreneurs are also prevalent in the extractive and the medium and heavy industries of Asia. We realize that the lack of entrepreneurial skill and domestic capital often makes it difficult to start private ventures in some areas of Asia. Our sympathy with this problem is borne out by assistance to governmental industrial production efforts where not to have done so would have deprived a country of facilities necessary for subsequent development. We believe there are tremendous possibilities in Asia which require the initiative, skills and ingenuity of private business both domestic and foreign."

"... We believe that increasing cooperation among the countries represented here could contribute substantially to the development of each country as well as to the region as a whole. The exchange of experience, technical skills and goods and services within the Colombo Plan area is of mutual benefit. . . ."

"The purpose of United States policies and programs in this area is to help our Asian friends preserve and foster their independence, freedom and progress. We have come to understand each other's problems better through the exchange of ideas and experiences. We are all participants in a fast-changing contemporary world. In such a situation, an atmosphere of friendliness, the expression of trust, and a community of purpose are indispensable. . . ."

—G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor, Department of State, before the Colombo Plan Meeting, October 22, 1957.

In East and Central Africa, ". . . there is a growing climate favorable to the new 'Africanist' movement which . . . uncompromisingly advocates 'Africa for the Blacks.' " Discussing racial, economic and political tensions in this region, this article explains why this is so; and why "there is a growing disenchantment throughout East, Central and South Africa with 'reasonable' African leaders. . . ."

Perspective on Central Africa

BY KEITH IRVINE
Editor of Africa Weekly

We advocate Africa for Africans only. To those who have been waiting for extreme African nationalism we say here we are, having been born recently. We do not need to be welcomed."

These words, penned in February, 1958, in the steamy East African port of Dar es Salaam, announcing the formation of a new political organization, may prove to be historic, whether or not history also notices their author. For a considerable time events in British East and Central Africa have been virtually obliging "extreme African nationalism" to come into existence. As if fearful of the kind of future that such a birth might proclaim, African leaders in these areas have, almost to a man, hitherto been cautious and restrained in political speech.

Now, it seems, a new language is being spoken—a new language to fit a new era. Did not Nietzsche himself foretell that the twentieth century would be the era of the "Terrible Simplifiers"? Terrible simplicity, it seems, is bearing down on East and Cen-

tral Africa with giant strides. It will no longer be a question of the plural voting, of how many African seats there may be in the Legislative Council, of what secret agreements have or have not been drawn up between the Colonial Office and the white settlers, of the precise degree of integration to be practised in new colleges or universities, or of which companies are prepared to pay equal wages for equal work. Attitudes and decisions will now increasingly stem from the simple circumstance of whether a man's face be black, white, or brown.

British East and Central Africa, in effect, is an area which comprises six territories. In the East—Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika; in Central Africa—Nyasaland, and North and South Rhodesia. These six territories form what is left of the British-controlled Cape to Cairo axis—once the strategic backbone of the African continent. In 1948 the Nationalists' victory in South Africa removed the base of this backbone, and in the Suez crisis of 1956 Nasser effectively truncated the neck. The Sudan had already been severed in 1954. What is now left—awaiting the disposition of history—is British East and Central Africa.

British East and Central Africa is a long belt of territory, snaking all the way from the frontiers of the Transvaal Province up to the head waters of the Nile. The people inhabiting this area are united neither by language, history, religion, geography nor convenience. Physical juxtaposition, British rule and racial tension are the only factors that they hold in common. Generally speaking it may be said that the eventual end towards which the various British administrations in this area tend is that of the unifica-

Keith Irvine, a journalist specializing in African affairs, attended Achimota College in the Gold Coast. He is the former editor of the bi-monthly *Africa Today* and, since coming to the United States from Great Britain in 1952, has written for *The New Leader*, *The Nation*, *Washington Post*, *Current History* and others. Mr. Irvine is editor and publisher of *Africa Weekly*, and an accredited United Nations Correspondent for *The New Leader*.

tion of these vastly disparate territories into a single administrative unit. Local conditions, however, not only in East and Central Africa, but indeed in each individual territory, are subject to such variation that close examination is required. While events are moving swiftly in both East and Central Africa, we shall, for immediate purposes, restrict ourselves to an examination of the situation prevailing in Central Africa, since this is at once more complex and less generally known than that in the East African region.

The Central African Federation

In February, 1958, the worst floods in living memory swept down the Zambezi River, sweeping away a bridge, and seriously damaging the coffer dam of the Kariba project—the very symbol of the new Central African Federation—which is now under construction. There were those who saw in this circumstance a further symbol. The Federation of North Rhodesia, South Rhodesia and Nyasaland was imposed upon the three territories in 1953, not only without the consent of, but indeed against the wishes of virtually the entire African populations concerned. Continuing African opposition to Federation, a drastic fall in the price of copper on which the Federation is economically reliant, and an open split between the two most influential white politicians on the subject of the race question confronted the Federal leaders, in 1958, with the gravest situation that they had yet encountered.

In the meantime the cry of "Unscramble the Federation" had been raised in England, where the British Parliament still retains a degree of jurisdiction over the populations of North Rhodesia and Nyasaland, due to the fact that these populations, unlike those of South Rhodesia, did not come under British rule by conquest, but by virtue of the fact that they voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of the Great Good Queen—Victoria. Every one of these events—not least the last—has been disquieting to the Federal administration, which, more than any other in Africa, is not dependent upon the consent of the governed, but upon conveying an impression of stabil-

ity to various overseas investment agencies.

The three territories which comprise the Central African Federation differ considerably. Nyasaland, which is regarded by many as a part of the East African hinterland, rather than of Central Africa proper, stabs deep into Mozambique, ending just over 100 miles from the coast. Nyasaland is agricultural in character, and its African population (2,580,000, as compared with 6,700 whites) feels deeply aggrieved at being linked with the alien and subject land of South Rhodesia, with which they are not even directly linked by rail. Between the Nyasa capital of Zomba and the South Rhodesian capital of Salisbury there is as great a distance, geographically as well as in social mores, as there is between New York and Richmond, Virginia.

North Rhodesia is both agricultural and industrial. While the Copper Belt forms a growing industrial complex, not dissimilar to others in South Africa and the Belgian Congo, large areas have been left virtually undisturbed by Europeans, except for the routine ministrations of the Colonial Office. There are in North Rhodesia 66,000 Europeans, and 2,110,00 Africans.

South Rhodesia has the greatest number of Europeans—178,000, compared with 2,290,000 Africans. South Rhodesia is also largely agricultural, and partly for this reason, partly for historic reasons, the African population has shown less signs of organizing itself than in the other two territories, although a moribund Congress movement was reconstituted a short while since, and has been showing increasing signs of life. European rule, in South Rhodesia, has been more directly imposed through the medium of an African Council, instead of, as in the other two territories, indirectly in the Luard style through chiefs and their councils.

Historically Nyasaland came under British influence as a result of David Livingstone's travels, South Rhodesia as a result of Rhodes' intervention, and North Rhodesia as a result of their combined, although separate, activities. South Rhodesia was occupied in two stages by Rhodes and his commercial company. In 1890, a column of 200 white South Africans, engaged with the promise of a 3,000 acre farm and 15 gold

claims each, occupied Mashonaland on the company's behalf. Three years later the chartered company invaded Matabeleland through the agency of 672 white men, who were each engaged by a contract which promised them individually 6,000 acres of land, 20 gold claims, and (specifically) "loot" to be divided in the proportion of half to the company, and "the remainder to officers and men in equal shares." The company's troops then went into battle against the Matabele warriors, massacring over 10,000 of them with machine guns before taking over the country, which was then united with Mashonaland. At a victory banquet in Capetown the notorious Dr. Jameson, whose actions later helped precipitate the Boer War, announced that the new country was christened Rhodesia. In North Rhodesia, as in South, Rhodes gained for the British South Africa Company a Royal Charter, as a result of which, in 1911, the area was unified under its present name.

The present-day tensions which exist in the Central African Federation largely spring from the tradition established by the violent methods and gainful motives which resulted in the foundation of the original Rhodesia. Rhodes' own psychology, which might be characterised as that of a robber baron, and which in political terms he summed up in the famous phrase: "I prefer land to niggers," has understandably had a not inconsiderable effect upon racial attitudes in the land of which he is the Founding Father. Moreover, the fact that the conquest is still of relatively recent date has meant that harsher social attitudes still tend to prevail. African protest against the imposition of Federation in 1953 was based on the belief, which has not proved without some justification, that the administrative change would lead to the extension of harsh South Rhodesian racial attitudes to the other two territories, rather than to any counter influences penetrating South.

Racism in Central Africa


Indeed, race relations in the Federation today have often been distinguished by tensions as severe as those now prevailing in the Union of South Africa. Two differences, however, exist: Firstly, race relations in the

Federation have not yet received the publicity accorded those in the Union—a circumstance which has largely deprived the Federation of the ultimately beneficial stimulus of informed criticism from abroad. Secondly, race relations have not been softened in their impact, as they have been to a certain extent in South Africa, by civilizing influences emanating from centers of learning or from certain areas, such as the Cape Province.

Thus while not all Africans in the Federation are unalterably opposed to Federation (the rare examples include Lawrence Vambe, editor of the *African Eagle*, and Lawrence Kutilungu, the trade unionist) even those who wish the Federation well admit that it has no future unless the racial problem takes a turn for the better in the near future. When a delegation of seven British M.P.'s (four Conservative and three Labour) from the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association visited the Federation recently, they reported, in January, 1958:

At present only a few non-Europeans are able to associate with Europeans on terms of social equality. . . . We hope that it will be progressively possible for federal services to remove distinctions that still remain, such as separate entrances to post offices. . . . The dearth of contact between Europeans and Africans except on the basis of employer and workman is dangerous.

Despite such worthy expressions of hope, the reality of "apartheid" in the Federation tends to remain stubbornly the same. Mr. Ian Civil, a Salisbury schoolteacher, had come to the Federation from Britain in 1954. Finding that he made no African friends in the prevailing circumstances, he went out of his way to make some. He thereupon found himself ostracized by the local European community. When his intention of improving "contact between Europeans and Africans" to the extent of becoming himself engaged to an African girl became known, he was promptly deported. (Deportation is, incidentally, a favored stratagem of the Federal Government, having been exercised on various occasions against visiting advocates of multi-racialism, including the Reverend Michael Scott of the London Africa Bureau, the Reverend



AFRICA

U. S. Government Printing Office

George Houser of the American Committee on Africa, and Basil Davidson, author of *The African Awakening*.

Mr. Lawrence Vambe, the above-mentioned African editor—whose grandfather was a Mashona leader in the 1896 rebellion,

and was executed by the British as a result—returning enthusiastically from a State Department sponsored tour of the United States to proclaim the glad tidings that there is no limit to any country's future providing that there is no economic color bar, promptly found himself ejected from the "Embassy" Hotel in Salisbury by the South African-born manager after he had been invited to a cocktail party there as the guest of an American antibiotics firm.

Disillusion with Central African reality also awaited the North Rhodesian African political leader, Harry Nkumbula, who upon his return from the Ghana independence celebrations in 1957 became immediately involved in an ugly scene. On leaving the airport on foot, he attempted to buy a soft drink: he was then severely beaten by white assailants "as a lesson," and only saved himself by drawing a knife.

Small wonder that, faced with such daily realities, the very terms of "partnership" and "multi-racialism" that are found so often on the lips of the white politicians on public occasions and when speaking to those from abroad have become not merely meaningless but actually discredited among Africans. For example, "Capricorn"—the name of a society founded to advance the cause of multi-racialism—has become a popular term for "police informer" in North Rhodesia.

Nor has the Church been able to ameliorate the situation or to stand for principle, as it has in South Africa. When in 1956 in North Rhodesia an African woman and a European man attempted to marry they could not find a minister of religion to solemnize the occasion, even among the Anglicans. The result of such incidents, not unnaturally, has been to identify Christianity as a religion "for whites only." When in 1958 a religious society attempted to distribute Bibles to Africans (an activity traditionally associated with the last century), the miners on the Copperbelt not only burnt the Bibles but became so hostile that the society had to discontinue this aspect of its work.

Other Frictions

Tension, however, is not confined to that existing between the different racial com-

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munities; it also exists inside them. On the African side tribal feuds from the old days are often carried over into modern life, while on the European side new feuds have been initiated. The severest of such modern feuds is that which has developed between Mr. Garfield Todd, formerly Prime Minister of South Rhodesia, and Sir Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Federation. This feud, which recently became public when Sir Roy privately persuaded Garfield Todd's cabinet to resign *en bloc* while Todd was on vacation, does not only represent a conflict between the two leading personalities in the Federation: it also has deeper roots. Historically it might be understood as a collision between the Rhodes tradition—represented by Sir Roy, who consciously models himself on the "Empire Builder"—and the Livingston tradition—represented by Todd. This man, himself a missionary, has an obstinate and disconcertingly genuine belief in the validity of the "partnership" concept, which the great majority of the white Central Africans understand to be a principle to be admired, like the Ten Commandments, rather

than a practice to be followed. While no liberal (it was he who banned North Rhodesian African leaders from travelling to South Rhodesia, and vice versa), Todd nevertheless, like Gladstone, Sir Stafford Cripps and John Foster Dulles, gives a religious basis to his political actions. Sir Roy's policies, however, are soundly based on the principles of Machiavelli.

Even these personal attributes of the two men, which have done much to dramatize the political struggle between them, do not convey an understanding of the conflict in all its dimensions. The immediate cause of the crisis was Todd's proclaimed intention of advancing the basic wages of African workers. The remoter cause was the development of a latent policy conflict between the Rhodesian Selection Trust (an Anglo-American concern, which favors American theories of production and management, and which can count Todd among its supporters), and the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa (a South African concern, controlled by Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, which follows the South African pattern of industrial conduct, and which finds more favor with Welensky than with Todd).

The result of the clash between the two men has been the extension of these various divisions to the Central African public at large, and even into the international scene. African, American and British opinions have, in general, supported Todd; South African and Central African white opinion have, in general, supported Welensky. This development, however, was not foreseen by Welensky, who had merely envisaged the political elimination of Todd. The result has been that, following the intervention of Lord Malvern (Sir Godfrey Huggins), the first Prime Minister who is now in retirement, Sir Edgar Whitehead, a close intimate of Malvern's, has been recalled from the Federation's Washington office to assume the South Rhodesian premiership until such time as the predominantly white electorate can be consulted. Todd, who has great influence with overseas investors, being too important a man to be dismissed, has been appointed South Rhodesian Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. While the crisis is not resolved; it has been arrested.

Increasingly, however, it is becoming impossible to separate developments in Africa from those in the world at large. The Federal government, and to an even greater extent the North Rhodesian administration, are primarily dependent upon the copper industry for their revenue. When copper prices (by February, 1958) dropped to 23 and a half cents a pound from more than twice that price less than two years earlier, the Federal Government, like most agencies and individuals in the Federation, suddenly found itself in comparatively straitened circumstances. Central Africa's "boom" period, when white miners on the Copperbelt achieved the highest wage standard in the world, the United States not excluded, came to an end in 1957 when the "copper bonus" was cut. Since then the industry has fallen into even worse straits with the closing of Bancroft, one of the six big mines on the Copperbelt. The Federation is entering a period of economic and political stress.

What About 1960?

The still unanswered question, however, is whether or not the Federation will be granted dominion status by 1960. Sir Roy Welensky has long complained that countries like Ghana, Malaya and Nigeria are headed for independence at "breakneck speed," but that the Federation finds itself "forgotten." He does not, however, mention the fact that if the Federation were to break away from British control before the introduction of universal adult suffrage, power would pass not into the hands of the majority, but into the control of a small settler-immigrant managerial class, thus creating a second "South African" situation on the African continent. This is, in fact, with a few superficial differences, the goal towards which Sir Roy is striving. Sir Roy made it quite clear, in the course of recent debates concerning the Constitution Amendment Bill, that he was "no believer in universal adult suffrage," and that while he heads the Government "there will never be any question of our considering universal adult suffrage."

The implications of this are, of course, immense. They mean, in effect, that as long as Welensky is in power, the Federation can

never belong to the democratic world. The Federation's obvious ally, therefore, becomes South Africa—a country from which a high proportion of Central Africa's white citizens has already come. It is ironic to reflect that one of the principal arguments put forward by the proponents of Federation in 1953 was that its creation would block the northward advance of South African attitudes.

There remains, however, the fact that without foreign investment capital the Federation would soon crumble into its component parts. Two sources of capital suggest themselves—the United States and South Africa. Until now the Federation has been receiving capital from both sources. As the problem of democracy versus race becomes more acute, the question of a choice presents itself. In political terms the choice lies for the time being, as we have indicated, between the policies of Todd and those of Welensky. The next decision, therefore, ultimately rests with Britain. There seems to be little doubt that the faction of the Conservative Party which now makes Britain's African policy will ensure, if still in office, that the decision is in Welensky's favor. Should Labour win a British election between now and 1960, however, the matter might be thrown into question, although past experience and present indications might suggest that, whatever British public opinion might say, Labour's African policy may not differ in any essential respect from that now pursued by the Conservatives.

In Central Africa, however, as in East and South Africa, the Africans are coming to realize that so long as they depend upon popular sentiment in Britain or upon the promises made by the Labour Party when it is out of office, they are unlikely to win much tangible advantage. As a result there is a growing climate favorable to the new

"Africanist" movement which has already appeared independently in East and South Africa, and which uncompromisingly advocates "Africa for the Blacks." There is a growing disenchantment throughout East, Central and South Africa with "reasonable" African leaders, such as Luthuli in the South, Nyerere in the East, and Chirwa in the Federation, who show themselves ready to play the white parliamentary game—multiple votes, complicated voting qualifications and all—oblivious of the fact that those who win the resulting elections are also those who make up the rules by which they shall be conducted. For while the British, unlike the French in some other African territories, have never gone so far as to break their own rules, they have evolved in East and Central Africa various methods of conducting elections without expressing the will of the majority—methods which have, so far, served their immediate purpose.

The fatal flaw in this reasoning; however, has been the failure to take into account the fact that the outside world already exerts some influence upon the course of events in Central Africa, and in the years ahead will come to exert considerably more. The fact that T.D.T. Banda, President of the Nyasaland African National Congress, was forcibly prevented from travelling to Cairo in December to attend Nasser's Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference will not prevent Africans from eventually finding support from beyond the federal borders. The tide of history in Africa is increasingly running in favor of the Africans. The sooner that the whites, who live in the various territories, recognize this fact instead of opposing it, the smoother the course of that history will be—and the sooner will a new society and a new civilization be built in Africa that will genuinely reflect the aspirations of that continent's inhabitants.

"From the mere recital of the present status of three outstanding African movements—nationalism, racialism and detribalization—it is evident that the continent, like molten metal, is fluid and ready to be molded. This does not automatically mean that it will be molded into the Western image. In the second half of the 20th century it is clear that neither Africa nor any other part of the world is a Western preserve, inviolate and unassailable."

—Julius C. Holmes, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, in an address, *Africa: Its Challenge to the West*, January 27, 1958.

Before 1939, ". . . a major reason for the ease of Commonwealth relationships was that basically the domestic policies of the pre-war dominions had but little interest for one another." This article explores the changing relations between South Africa and other members of the Commonwealth since World War II, with the entry of the non-white new members.

South Africa in the Commonwealth

BY COLIN RHYS LOVELL

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CHANGES in the character of the Commonwealth since World War II have produced an uncertain reaction in the Union of South Africa. World revulsion against anything hinting of racial discrimination has received expression in the United Nations. Within the British Empire the force of nationalism, stimulated by the war, along with British idealism and realism, has caused the addition of six new members of the Commonwealth. Like the old ones they are fully sovereign nations; unlike them the new members of the club have non-white governments, and thereby they are different from the pre-war members of the club.

Against this backdrop the 1948 South African elections brought to power a government whose members and supporters had bitterly opposed South African participation in the war and in some instances were open sympathizers with Nazi ideology. More important for subsequent Commonwealth relations, the new government of Dr. Daniel F. Malan of the Nationalist Party (and including the allied Afrikaner Party under N. C. Havenga) advocated the frank policy of what had been the covert aim of all previous South African governments—the maintenance of supremacy of a small white minority, approximately 20 per cent of the total

population of the Union. This practical interpretation of Nationalist *apartheid* meant that South Africa moved in an opposite direction from general world opinion. The Nationalists (with whom the Afrikaner Party merged in 1950) have done well in this countermovement, increasing their strength in 1953 and holding their own in 1958.

Sharp differentiation of basic South African racial policy from that of other members of the Commonwealth would not be important by pre-war rules of the club. All its members then understood that each, including the United Kingdom, was completely independent of all others. The 1926 Imperial Conference formally enunciated this rule, largely at the behest of the South African Prime Minister, General J. B. M. Hertzog. In 1931, the principle received statutory expression in the British Statute of Westminster, and three years later South Africa made it part of its own law in the Status of the Union Act. Prior to 1939 no member challenged the full sovereignty of another; and if they had problems, they solved them by direct and informal consultations—but never with a public display of dirty linen. However, a major reason for the ease of Commonwealth relationships was that basically the domestic policies of the pre-war dominions had but little interest for one another.

This underlying reason for the efficacy of the principle of dominion sovereignty disappeared after World War II with the entrance into the Commonwealth club of India. India immediately challenged the sovereignty of the Union of South Africa in its treatment of its Indian population.

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Although only a small percentage of the total population (2.5 per cent in 1946 and a trifle over 3 per cent in 1958), its concentration in Natal and the Transvaal, (respectively Hindu and Muslim), emphasized its commercial vigor, which made it unpopular with all other ethnic groups in South Africa. The South African Indian National Congress openly looked to India to win full civil and political rights for Indians in the Union.

Civil and Political Rights

The Indian issue was an old one for South Africa, where Gandhi had first used his technique of civil disobedience and passive resistance. Prior to World War II all South African governments had rested their case on dominion sovereignty and thereby had an advantage over a dependent India. Nevertheless, in 1927, Malan as Minister of the Interior in the Hertzog Pact (Nationalist-Labor) Ministry negotiated an agreement with the Indian government, still under British control, whereby the Union would give generous bounties to South African Indians emigrating to India.

This "repatriation" proved to be no solution to the Indian problem. Few South African Indians, whose families had come to South Africa in the 1860's as indentured workers in the Natal sugar fields, had ever seen India. Those few who did go to their "homeland" quickly returned to South Africa, where they continued to press white businessmen closely and to acquire desirable property.

In 1946, the Smuts government, recognizing world opinion and the fact that the Indian government was now under Indian control and would soon be a dominion, gave Natal and Transvaal Indians a limited communal franchise. However, to placate its own supporters, the government joined the grant with an absolute prohibition against further property acquisitions by India. The South African Indian Congress denounced the law as a fraud and successfully urged Indians to boycott the elections. From New Delhi came a protest from the new Indian government headed by Nehru. When Smuts invoked the old principle of dominion sov-

ereignty, Nehru withdrew the Indian High Commissioner from the Union.

South African irritation at this violation of the rules of the club became anger when India appealed to the United Nations as a supra-national body, claiming it had power to intervene to protect non-whites against South African official policy. In 1946, Mme. Pandit, Nehru's sister, launched a vitriolic attack on Union racial policies in the General Assembly and blocked a request by Smuts for the incorporation into the Union of its mandate of Southwest Africa. Instead, at Mme. Pandit's instigation, the Assembly ordered South Africa to bring the mandate under U.N. trusteeship control. When Smuts ignored the resolution, with the approval of all South African parties, Nehru imposed an embargo on Indian trade with South Africa to the inconvenience of its farmers, who depended upon Indian jute bags for their grain. Smuts offered the old Commonwealth device of direct conversations, but the Indian leader refused unless South Africa shifted Southwest Africa to U.N. trusteeship.

For the next ten years India, first as a dominion and then as a republic within the Commonwealth, with Pakistan following the Indian lead at some distance, demanded this transfer and U.N. intervention in South African racial policy at each session of the U.N. General Assembly. Each session the Union delegate, with significant British support, denied the competence of the U.N. in terms of its own charter to act in a purely domestic matter.

The replacement of the Smuts by the Malan ministry in 1948 exacerbated relations between the two members of the Commonwealth. The new Union government promptly repealed the never-exercised Indian franchise, and in 1950 the whites of Southwest Africa received representation in the Union Parliament. Although the territory was still not officially incorporated into the Union, this last action was South African defiance of the U.N. and a recent opinion of the International Court of Justice, thereby adding to Indian charges. When India in 1950 and 1951 asked the U.N. to prevent the operation of the Union's Group Areas Act, calling for business and residen-

tial racial segregation, most white South Africans were certain that South African Indians and Nehru had an understanding; and the next year even Malan's opponents agreed with his accusation that Nehru was subsidizing the passive resistance campaign in the Union against the law.

Indian attacks lost some force when in 1950 Pakistani-Indian relations had so deteriorated that the Pakistan government raised the embargo on South African trade, imposed by Nehru when India was still united. The Pakistanis had never been pleased at Nehru's assumption that Hindu India was the protector equally of Muslim and Hindu Indians in the Union. Pakistan also announced its willingness to hold direct talks with the Union if India participated. Although one of the Indian-sponsored resolutions passed by the U.N. Assembly called for such a conference, Nehru would not accept the plan unless the U.N. retained power to intervene should the conference reach no agreement. This proviso was unacceptable to Malan, who announced that South Africa would discuss only the repatriation of Indians.

South African-Indian relations reached their nadir when in 1954 Malan declared Nehru the Union's "greatest enemy" and charged him with fostering "communism" in the Union. Nehru retorted by withdrawing the skeleton staff of the Indian High Commissioner's office in Pretoria. The only channel between the two governments was the United Kingdom, which now employed the pre-war technique of informal soundings among the three governments in the hope of bringing them together, without the intervention of the United Nations but with South Africa agreeing to discuss more than Indian repatriation at a conference. The new, or rather old, approach by the British seemed to be on the verge of success when in 1955 Nehru made a speech in India against South African racial policies. The Union Minister of External Affairs, Eric Louw, refused to proceed further. Thus the Indians and South Africans stood stiffly aloof, neither giving way but with the advantage lying to the Union, which continued its traditional racial policy.

South Africa ceased to be concerned about

the usual Indian attacks in the United Nations, although the Union delegate invariably walked out; but the Union was pleased by the consistent British support of its legal contention. Indian charges also lost force in the U.N. as post-war idealism dissipated and as its members compared the equivocal attitude of Nehru on the Korean War with the participation in it of the South African "Flying Cheetah" squadron. India's stubborn refusal to have a plebiscite in Kashmir and its later annexation of that part under Indian military occupation, as well as its tacit encouragement of the tragic and abortive unarmed invasion of Portuguese Goa (on whose successful defence Malan congratulated Portugal) —all dimmed Nehru's lustre in the U.N.

At the 1956 General Assembly session the new Indian representative, Krishna Menon, possibly thinking of Kashmir, emphasized that the U.N. must recognize the sovereign independence and equality of its members—the South African position for a decade. A year later the Canadian delegate declared that his government's experience with a few primitive people showed that South Africa had to treat its large numbers of primitives differently from Europeans.

The Central African Federation

Canadian support and consistent backing from Great Britain cheered the Malan government, but after its experiences with India it wanted no more "Piedmonts" for its other non-white elements, particularly the Bantu, two-thirds of the Union's population. Yet the road for just such a state began to appear in 1951 when Nkwame Nkrumah, an African, became a minister in the British Gold Coast. Malan was jolted by this "unrealistic" British policy in Africa, which might, he said, force the Union to reconsider its position in the Commonwealth, whose cultural character had changed so drastically since the war. The Prime Minister's views received a sort of negative proof when in 1954 the new Central African Federation fell short of full dominion independence due to public fears in Britain that despite its slogan of "partnership" between whites and non-whites, its white minority might use

complete independence to follow the Union example in its racial policies.

However, the existence of the Federation created a counterpoise to South African influence south of the Sahara and reduced the weight of Malan's hint of secession. When he suggested that members of the Commonwealth have a veto over prospective new members, he found the other dominions and Britain indifferent, so that with his troubles with India, Malan had to be content with the previous method of consultation of dominions by Britain before it created a new one.

Ghana

British opinion pressed for full dominion status for the Gold Coast, almost as a gesture of defiance in late 1954 to the new Prime Minister of the Union, J. G. Strijdom, who was supposedly a more extreme racialist than Malan. However, when consulted on the question by Britain, the Strijdom ministry gave unqualified approval and sent a special representative to the 1957 celebrations attendant on the transformation of the Gold Coast into the independent dominion of Ghana, which received warm congratulations and technical assistance from the Union government.

The official position of South Africa now is that co-existence between "black" and "white" states in Africa is possible, and at least for the moment Prime Minister Nkrumah shows no interest in South African Bantu. How long this disinterest will continue on either side is problematical, and Eric Louw has toyed with the idea of a federation of "white" states to balance Ghana.

Difficulties with India and concern about the meaning of Ghana have not driven South Africa from the Commonwealth, which is more remarkable because the government since 1948 has had little love for the Commonwealth. In 1940 both Malan and Strijdom endorsed the Nationalist draft constitution for an Afrikaner-dominated republic outside the Commonwealth. In power, however, they have only nibbled at the republican loaf.

Malan attended all the Commonwealth Conferences. At the one of 1949 he warmly

supported the proposal by India that it become a republic but remain in the Commonwealth. Obviously, Malan's approval of the plan, later followed also by Pakistan and Ceylon, was not for love of India but as a precedent for South Africa. But far from following the precedent, Malan soon afterward declared that a republic would come in South Africa only if a large majority of voters (which would mean substantial English support) pronounced favorably on it at a special election.

The Union and the Queen

Although the government has made gestures very disturbing to the English minority in the Union, it has carefully avoided going beyond the point of no return toward a republic. In 1949, it followed the example of Britain and Ceylon in a new nationality law separating South African citizenship from the broad concept of British subject. Yet in the same year the Union participated in a Commonwealth defence conference. In 1950, following Canadian example, the government ended appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; but N. C. Havenga, Minister of Finance (possibly recalling the debacle of 1931 and 1932 when he acted differently), had the South African pound follow the British pound downward. In the 1953 elections the Nationalists stressed apartheid and prosperity, not republicanism.

Soon afterward the Malan ministry used the forthcoming coronation of Elizabeth II not to proclaim a republic, but to enact a new royal titles law on the Ceylon model. If deliberately silent on her being sovereign of Great Britain, this made her "Head of the Commonwealth" and specifically declared her "Queen of South Africa." Irony continued in the consistent designation by the Nationalist press of the new ruler as "Queen of Great Britain," while the English opposition papers referred to her simply as "the Queen." Yet the English press carefully retouched pictures of Princess Margaret on her trip to the nascent West Indian Federation, a future dominion, so that readers should not see her mingling with Negroes.

Malan's supporters were not pleased with his legal acceptance of monarchy and were disappointed that he attended the corona-

tion and the Commonwealth Conference in 1953. To placate his followers he denied that monarchy was a permanent part of the Union's constitution and deprecated "Queen of South Africa" as mere symbolism. However, he also expressed opposition to South African secession from the Commonwealth simply to get more freedom—the Union was already completely free. If all this meant a republic within the Commonwealth, Malan made no move toward it, although he was irritated by British press criticisms of apartheid, saying darkly that they did South African-British relations no good. But words did not precede action, and in the year of Malan's retirement the Union's High Commissioner in London was telling South Africa that it had more friends in responsible circles than the English press would indicate.

The belief that Strijdom would rush where Malan lagged proved illusory. Although the new Prime Minister ostentatiously refused to attend Commonwealth Conferences (except in 1956 when the London press and B.B.C. were friendly toward him), and instead significantly sent the Minister of External Affairs to them, gestures seemed to satisfy Strijdom. In 1955, he described to his Transvaal Nationalists the essential conditions for a republic, which included active English support. For an author of the 1940 draft constitution, which envisaged bare toleration of the English, this was a reversal.

In 1957, the government ended the dual flag compromise of 1927, whereby the Union Jack symbolized South African membership in the Commonwealth. Strijdom now said that the Jack was a foreign flag, but he did not change the design of the remaining National Flag, which in its white center stripe carried the Jack along with the flags of the old Boer republics. At the same time *Die Stem van Suid-Afrika*, now translated for the English as *The Call of South Africa*, became the single, official national anthem with the approval of the Cape *Argus* and Johannesburg *Star*, both opposition papers, although Strijdom angered many English by calling *God Save the Queen* a foreign anthem.

These gestures might be leading to a re-

public; but when Eric Louw late in 1957 declared in a broadcast for Australian listeners that changes in the British government (meaning a Labor ministry) or in the organization of the Commonwealth (more "black" states) might affect South African views about a republic, the Prime Minister in his 1958 New Year's greeting to the Union was pointedly silent about a republic and stressed racial cooperation.

The Union and Defence

In its defence policy the Nationalist government since 1948 has tied the Union more closely to Britain than did its predecessors. The fear of a Communist thrust into Africa has made the government link its defence plans with other African colonial powers, particularly Britain. Prior to World War II Nationalists damned any such cooperation and disliked the Union's obligation under an agreement of 1921 to defend the landward side of the British naval base at Simonstown near Cape Town. They had then demanded that South Africa take over the base to guard against involvement in "British" wars. In 1953, F. C. Erasmus, Minister of Defence, began talks with the United Kingdom on such a transfer. The British were not adverse to the idea, but South African concern about India and the new counterpoise of the Central African Federation allowed the British to drive a close bargain in the final agreement in 1955.

Although Simonstown duly went to the Union in 1957, South Africa had to allow its use by the Royal Navy and allied fleets in peace, or an equivalent port in time of war, whether South Africa was neutral or a belligerent. The agreement ensured that it would be the latter, particularly when Erasmus allowed the fact to leak out that the R.A.F. was to have bases in the Union in time of war. The Nationalists thus doubly guaranteed South African participation in every future "British" war.

The High Commission Territories

Like its predecessors, the Nationalist government has kept alive the perennial issue of the British High Commission territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland.

The South Africa Act of 1909 envisaged their eventual transfer to the Union, but no British government dared to effect this in view of South Africa's native policy. The British therefore took the view that consultation with the protectorate natives was an essential condition for transfer. Although South Africa pointed out that "consultation" was not the same as "consent," the vigorous opposition of protectorate natives to being under Union native administration made the transfer impossible for the British government.

After 1948, the open white supremacy policy of the Nationalist ministry made transfer even less likely. Malan emphasized the dependence of protectorate natives upon jobs in the Union; secretly he feared that Bechuanaland might go to the Central African Federation. He did not expect much from the British Laborites; but the Churchill Conservative government proved no more amenable to transfer, Churchill frankly telling Malan that he hoped that he would not press the issue.

With its problems with India and hopes for Simonstown, the Malan ministry could not press the issue, which became academic after the Union's Bantu Education Act of 1954 stiffened English public opinion against turning over more natives to South Africa. In 1955, during the last stages of the Simonstown negotiations, the Strijdom government tried to join the protectorates to the Simonstown transfer by closing the Union's borders to protectorate natives. Although dramatizing native dependence on South Africa for work, the action revealed that Transvaal and Orange Free State farmers needed labor and were infuriated. After 24 hours of angry protests, the government announced that the frontier closing had been an "administrative error"; and the protectorates did not go with Simonstown to the Union.

In 1956, at the Commonwealth Conference, Strijdom brought up the matter again and with the same results. Instead of being angry, the Prime Minister merely said that the South Africa Act had clearly indicated their eventual transfer to the Union. Plainly, Strijdom was not going to press Britain nor seize the protectorates as some Nationalists urged; Britain was backing South Africa at

the United Nations and was essential for the defence of the sea routes around the Cape.

South Africa was careful not to be anti-British in the Suez crisis. Although Louw emphasized that the government regarded the nationalization of the canal by Egypt as its own affair, he also failed to send instructions to the Union delegate at the U.N. as to his position on the Anglo-French-Israeli attack in 1956, so that the South African representative was able to abstain from voting on the cease-fire resolution. Instead, Louw stressed the availability of South African ports to shipping diverted from the blocked canal. The lesson was clear for Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand as shipping moved through South African harbors, where it received rapid handling. In 1957, the Australian representative at the U.N. added his voice to those of Britain and Canada to deplore the constant Indian attacks on South Africa.

For South African Nationalists there are also facts to ponder. In the 1958 elections they have rung the changes once more of white supremacy, the menace of "communism" as broadly defined by them, and prosperity; but the republican chime has been muted. Whether Strijdom will go further toward a republic, assuming his health permits him to remain in office, is problematical. Should he retire, his probable successor, T. E. Dönges, now Minister of the Interior and leader of the Cape Nationalists with the mantle of Malan upon him, can be expected to make more gestures toward a republic but avoid achieving one.

Would a republic of South Africa, especially outside the Commonwealth, receive support from the older members of the club against a real Indian attack? Would a republic even leave the Nationalists in power? The hope-deferred nature of the republic has been the core around which otherwise rather diverse elements have grouped themselves in the party. In 1955, the head of the influential *Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultur Verenigings* told its members that a republic would mean a complete political realignment. Nationalist leaders have not learned to love the Commonwealth or monarchy more, but they may find themselves keeping both for the lack of anything better.

The Kashmir dispute is of grave concern to the Commonwealth; "repeated attempts at mediation have failed and, if anything, have instead furthered tensions within the Commonwealth." This specialist emphasizes also that "the Kashmir dispute is affecting all Indian thinking on world politics. . . . It diminishes the size of India's valuable contributions to peace."

Kashmir and India's Foreign Policy

BY WERNER LEVI

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THE dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is now over ten years old. The situation appears to have become stabilized short of war. But the price for this uneasy peace is high for the parties and the world at large. India and Pakistan are spending inordinately large sums and devoting dangerously large proportions of their productive capacity to the maintenance and support of a military establishment along their common borders. Their economic relations, while not entirely interrupted, are subject to severe restrictions. Strategic precautions for the security of both countries against potential threats from Communist Russia or Communist China are neglected.

The price for this peace is highest in the area of politics. The dispute is creating an atmosphere of tension in the peninsula which affects regions and issues far beyond the two countries immediately involved: it aggravates difficulties within the British Commonwealth, already beset by many unsolved problems; it hampers closer constructive cooperation among Asian nations for their own and the world's benefit; it produces constant dilemmas for nations desirous of maintaining friendly relations with both parties to the dispute; it opens the way for maneuvers by outside powers not always

conducive to the peace of the area; it prevents India from engaging to the fullest in her beneficial activities in the affairs of the United Nations or the Cold War; and it weakens the moral influence Mr. Nehru is trying to exert upon the politics of the world.

There have been many attempts to settle the dispute. The United Nations became involved at an early date, in 1949: observation and mediation commissions were established; individual negotiators and mediators were appointed: General A. G. L. McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon, Dr. Frank P. Graham, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. Friends from the Commonwealth offered their good offices and advice. The highest officials of the parties themselves met in conference. Yet, the only results of these activities, stretching over a decade, have been to stop the shooting and to make evident the incompatibility of the viewpoints of the disputants. Too much of the time, the parties—more than the mediators—have kept the arguments on a legalistic level; a method lending itself usually to interminable debate, especially in the absence of a supreme judge and enforceable sanctions.

In the meantime, the gulf between the two parties has become deeper and their irreconcilable positions gradually hardened. Early in 1957, finally, India claimed the end of the affair had come through the final and definitive accession of Kashmir to India, while she seems willing to let the United Nations take any further action only if the Organization will confirm this "settlement" of the dispute.

The length of the debate, its peculiarly formalistic nature, and changes in world

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politics affecting Asia have tended to obscure the stakes involved in the dispute. As a consequence, outsiders interested in helping to settle it have been unable to induce the parties to consider the interests involved on their merits or to evaluate rationally the ideological positions fundamental to the dispute.

These interests are primarily the strategic location of Kashmir in relation to both states as well as to neighboring states, especially China and the Soviet Union; the importance of Kashmir in regard to certain rivers vital for irrigation and hydroelectric power; the value of the Vale of Kashmir as a tourist center; and, finally, the potential significance of Kashmir as the source of needed raw materials. Except for negotiations over the water problem, these interests have rarely been mentioned in all the squabbles over the right or wrong of actions taken by the parties after the initial outbreak of the dispute; squabbles, in other words, over the symptoms rather than the causes of the conflict.

The Ideological Core

Unfortunately, even if this complex, "the Kashmir dispute," could be broken down into specific issues in an endeavor to settle each separately, the hard core of the dispute would remain untouched. This core is essentially psychological and ideological and therefore presumably beyond the reach of mediation or compromise. India is committed to a secular, democratic state. The inclusion of predominantly Muslim Kashmir within her borders is proof of her contention that Muslims and Hindus can coexist peacefully, that the ideological foundation of the Indian state is sound—quite apart from the fact that admission of Pakistan's right to incorporate all Muslim areas into her territory would raise serious questions regarding the more than 30 million Muslims living in India.

Pakistan, on the other hand, is committed to a religious state. The inclusion of Kashmir within her borders is therefore necessary as the fulfillment of the ideal upon which the state is founded: a national home and a national state for the Muslims of the


subcontinent. The realization of this ideal, beyond its intrinsic merits, is in the minds of many Pakistanis also a matter of standing and prestige in the Muslim world in general.

Such ideological considerations are, of course, particularly strong with the present generation of leaders in both countries because of the important part they played in the struggle for freedom and existence. They will recede in importance as both states grow older and their continued existence is beyond question. But until that time, the positions of the antagonists are unlikely to change substantially and the political atmosphere of the subcontinent will continue to be poisoned by their dispute.

Effect on the Commonwealth

Some outsiders most closely concerned are the members of the Commonwealth, to whom this "quarrel within the family" is very disturbing. The most loyal supporters of the Commonwealth—to be found in greater numbers in Australia and New Zealand than anywhere else—tend to see in it a confirmation of the fears they harbored all along about the admission of the Asian members into the Commonwealth. They feel that the strength and cohesion of the Commonwealth rest upon a sense of loyalty, of heritage and of blood relationship which the Asian members can not possibly share and which transcend, and therefore overcome all possible conflicts among the older members. Admitting the Asians to membership was bound to shake the foundations of the Commonwealth and alter its fundamental nature. It would turn, in their slightly mystic view, from an "organic structure" into a functional association of states, into a mere utilitarian instrument which each member would use expediently in pursuit of his own advantages.

That this is indeed what has been happening, but was in fact happening before the admission of the Asian states, is not easily admitted by the more enthusiastic or emotional adherents of the Commonwealth system. Yet even they must occasionally confess that some of the substance of the Commonwealth relationship lies in the concrete, functional benefits the system provides and



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that a decline in these benefits is affecting the cohesion of the system. To deny this would be impossible in the face of the solid evidence. London has long since ceased to speak "with one voice" for the Commonwealth, not only because various members have reached "adulthood" and can express their own policies, but also because these policies are no longer necessarily parallel.

In individual instances, members have

found that their national interests are too far apart to be expressed in some synthesized interest of the Commonwealth. The neutralism of India and other members, for instance, makes the coordination of some vital policies quite impossible. Commonwealth members are far apart on the recognition of Communist China and her treatment (although this was to be discussed and handled in common). The question of

regional alliances and of blocs has driven members into diametrically opposed positions. Trading interests do not always coincide with the traditional approach to Commonwealth preference. Such loyal members as Australia and New Zealand have seen fit to make defense arrangements with the United States (the ANZUS Pact) from which Great Britain is excluded not only as a partner but also as an observer.

The result of this trend has been that at the periodic Commonwealth conferences of the Prime Ministers certain topics, such as military matters, strategy or alliances, are not even mentioned any more in the sure knowledge that they would merely contribute to the creation of tension. Some defenders of the Commonwealth system rationalize that this is nothing more than the traditional right of all members to disagree or the traditional practice of avoiding topics on which disagreement is certain. But the increasing scope and importance of the areas of disagreement are gradually affecting the substance of the Commonwealth system. The foundation of the Commonwealth, which was once the comprehensive community of interests with divergencies easily tolerated, is narrowing to some common interests with vast divergencies.

The existence of the dispute over Kashmir cannot fail to contribute to this development. The desire of many Commonwealth members to see it settled, preferably within the Commonwealth, is easily understandable. But repeated attempts at mediation have failed and, if anything, have instead furthered tensions within the Commonwealth. Great Britain has been reticent to handle this matter and preferred to take a neutral stand. Nevertheless, even such non-committal suggestions from London in Commonwealth Conferences or at the United Nations that a peaceful settlement of the issue would be desirable have produced accusations of partiality from India and Pakistan. Australia has been more active, primarily because the dispute interferes with her intense desire to establish good relations with all the neighbors in the Near North. Prime Minister Menzies before and during the Prime Ministers' Commonwealth Conference in 1951 made special efforts at mediation and pro-

posed several methods for the supervision of a plebiscite in Kashmir. But the reaction from India was merely sharp criticism.

This reaction is not too surprising considering the emotional and psychological involvement of the leaders in the issue and, on a more general level, in anything coming from the West, even if the source is the Commonwealth. Indeed, on this count, the Commonwealth is considered more purely Western and hence in a weaker position than the United Nations in India, judging by Mr. Nehru's statement in Parliament on February 12, 1951, that the presence of Commonwealth troops in Kashmir to supervise a plebiscite could not be tolerated because the history of the recent past made such troops suspect.¹

India's Outlook

But the United Nations has not been any more successful than the Commonwealth in settling the Kashmir dispute. Worse than that, the dispute affects India's positions on all other United Nations issues as well. Her whole outlook is colored by the Kashmir situation. United Nations action or non-action on Kashmir is considered a generally valid precedent by India, respectively her attitude toward other cases, as they arise, is often determined by the precedents these might create for the future of the Kashmir dispute. In other words, cases before the United Nations are too often judged in India by their possible relationship to Kashmir rather than on their merits. In very many cases, the Kashmir dispute has become the standard by which India is forming her United Nations policies. This is, of course, especially true when the Indian government thinks that such policies might somehow at the same time advance India's position in the dispute; though at other times the government has also shown inconsistencies by pursuing policies toward other nations in the United Nations which she would hardly tolerate toward herself. Naturally these policy considerations are not often openly admitted officially. But they can be discovered between the lines of offi-

¹ Later, Mr. Nehru of course also refused even to consider the admission of United Nations troops for the same purpose, but he did so for different reasons.

cial statements and easily found in newspaper editorials.

The Korean war, for instance, is a good illustration of the relationship with the Kashmir issue. There was great bitterness over the quick decision in the Security Council to declare North Korea the aggressor and the Council's failure to declare Pakistan an aggressor, as demanded by India. The contrast is striking, was a typical comment, "between the Security Council's boggling over Kashmir and rush for action in Korea." The subsequent unequal treatment of Korea as compared with Kashmir continued to create resentment in India (and, later, in Pakistan as well—for opposite reasons, of course),

The official Indian communiqué explaining India's vote in favor of the first two Security Council resolutions calling for action against aggression in Korea made it clear that "naturally India welcomed the procedure she had advocated in another case." The later refusal of India (or Pakistan) to contribute more than a field ambulance unit can in part be explained by the need to keep troops in Kashmir. The United Nations insistence upon the surrender of the North Korean armies as a prerequisite for a United Nations supervised plebiscite in all Korea was resented by India as inconsistent with the United Nations suggestion for a plebiscite in Kashmir without any demand for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops.² India quickly used this alleged inconsistency to stiffen her attitude on Kashmir. Similarly, India opposed the prosecution of the police action against North Korea to the point of defeat partly on the grounds that the United Nations had failed to apply coercive measures against Pakistan.

Another illustration of India's practice to relate cases before the United Nations to Kashmir can be discovered in her vote against the resolution before the Security Council, on November 8, 1956, calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw her troops from Hungary and for the holding of United Nations sponsored elections in Hungary. It was widely believed in India and elsewhere that this Indian vote was partly motivated by the reluctance to create a precedent for an internationally supervised election in Hungary which India was unwilling to have

take place in Kashmir. On the other hand, the Hungarian situation also provided an example of Indian inconsistency. While India has always demanded that Pakistan be branded an aggressor she refused to declare the Soviet Union an aggressor because as Mr. Nehru explained, name calling is unconstructive and does not solve conflicts.

India's experience with Kashmir has presumably contributed also to her generally cool attitude toward peaceful methods for the settlement of international disputes, especially when these involve decisions by a third party, as is the case in arbitration and in the process of the World Court. Instead, India prefers the least formalized methods, and attempts to rely on diplomacy and preferably on bilateral negotiation. She can thus avoid having outsiders, particularly Westerners, interfere in what she considers to be primarily Asian affairs. For it is fairly clear that the Kashmir dispute and India's desire to settle it in her way—once she did not obtain satisfaction from the United Nations—served to reinforce her predisposition to judge all Western methods as lacking "subtlety" (Mr. Nehru's term) and to demand that Asians should be left to settle Asian matters.

Such an approach is also necessary if Mr. Nehru's desire is to be fulfilled that India lead an Asia which can face the suspected West with a united front in its demands for equality of treatment and due respect for status and prestige. The Kashmir dispute is a serious threat to such a united front, just as it weakens Mr. Nehru's admonitions to other nations to use negotiation instead of force in the settlement of their disputes. Not only this, but the dispute also makes India unduly sensitive to events in world politics generally and thereby narrows her outlook and distorts her perspective.

Pacts and Alliances

Indian opposition to alliances and defense pacts, such as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, especially when they touch on Asia, would presumably be much milder were it not for the fact that the Kashmir

² One of the differences in the two cases was that the North Koreans refused to permit a supervised plebiscite while Pakistan agreed.

dispute exists and Pakistan is a participant in these arrangements.³ Even harmless references to Kashmir such as appeared in the SEATO communiqué of March, 1956, and in the Baghdad Pact powers' statement in March, 1956, that the solution of the Kashmir dispute would be desirable aroused the ire of the Indians and led to official protests. They were cited as proof that such military arrangements were destroying the "area of peace" India is trying to construct in Asia and were dragging the subcontinent into the Cold War. Yet, when Bulganin and Khrushchev declared during their visit to India in 1955 that Kashmir was an integral part of India, the Indians gladly accepted that declaration and failed to realize at first that it drew the dispute squarely into the Cold War.⁴

On the other hand, the much more neutral position of the United States on the Kashmir dispute in the United Nations has, probably because of its neutrality, brought it the accusation of partiality from India; an impression which Indians found confirmed to their own satisfaction when the United States supplied arms to Pakistan. They are unable, in their preoccupation with Kashmir, to accept the American view that there are security problems in the Indian subcontinent which need solution regardless of the Kashmir issue.

It is obvious that the Kashmir dispute is affecting all Indian thinking on world politics, and makes very difficult a meeting of

minds even with nations friendly to India but which see the world scene from a broader perspective. The unfortunate result of the dispute, quite apart from the immediate disadvantages and dangers for those directly concerned, is that it diminishes the size of India's valuable contributions to peace. For this reason alone the dispute and its solution become an object of interest to the world at large. Furthermore, as the Cold War enters the Indian subcontinent irrevocably and regardless of India's wishes, the Kashmir dispute recedes in importance before the wider issues and the greater dangers that war brings to both India and Pakistan.

The extraordinary sensitivity of India to the Kashmir issue makes it difficult for Indians to see this development and draw the necessary conclusions. However, the military precautions India is taking all along her northern border and the strict measures against the Communists internally she has always taken may be an indication that India is well aware of the direction from which the greatest danger may threaten. This awareness may well be a major factor contributing to the maintenance of the uneasy peace between India and Pakistan and may in the future lead to a solidification of that peace.

³ India has never specifically criticized the first military alliance in postwar Asia, that between the USSR and Communist China, concluded in 1950.

⁴ Mr. A. I. Mikoyan, first Deputy Premier of the USSR, virtually contradicted his colleagues during a visit to Pakistan in March, 1956, when he affirmed that the future of Kashmir should be determined by the Kashmiris. This statement was widely ignored in India.



"Unfortunately, we are accustomed to thinking of the world as being divided into power blocs. As a result we have tended to overlook a fact of vital importance. While it is true that the world is divided into power blocs—militarily—it is at the same time developing politically into a multi-national society with new challenges and new problems which demand the same common approach by the nations of the world as do those in the scientific and technological field.

"These challenges stem from the steadily increasing number of newly independent countries; they consist of the many new issues which arise from conflicting aspirations of these nations. We have only to look around us to see daily evidence of the disputes associated with the crumbling of ancient empires and the vigorous nationalism and intense anti-colonialism of newly emerging states. Nor is the new nationalism the only seed bed for new issues in the political field."

—Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, *The United Nations: Challenges of a New Age*, March 24, 1958.

"Britain should be proud of the task she has carried out in Malaya," writes this seasoned observer. "Few new countries have started their independence with a sounder economic basis and a better trained nucleus of leaders and administrators." Here the reader will find an analysis of the problems that "divide the three main races, Malays, Chinese and Indians."

Malaya: Problems of a Polyglot Society

BY GERALD P. DARTFORD

Author of A Short History of Malaya

ON August 11, 1786, a certain Captain Francis Light, acting for the British East India Company, took formal possession of the beautiful island of Penang off the Malay peninsula, with all the pomp and circumstance that he could muster. At this time the former American colonies were facing the problems posed by their newly won independence. There was a connection between these events on different sides of the world, for in the war which arose from the conflict in America the British and French fought each other on all the oceans of the globe. In this struggle, the British navy felt the need of a base on the east of the Bay of Bengal, sheltered from the north-east monsoon. It was hoped that Penang would supply this need, and the Company had at last listened to Light, who for long had urged them to accept the offer of Penang made to him by the Sultan of the Malay state of Kedah.

Thirty-three years later, in 1819, a greater man, Sir Stamford Raffles, founded a more important settlement on the island of Singa-

pore, to the south of the peninsula. This was one of the most strategic points for the trade of the East, and Singapore, during its short existence, has grown prodigiously.

In this way began Britain's responsibility for government in the Malay peninsula, which finally came to an end on August 31, 1957; when the Federation of Malaya took its place among the free nations of the world and the independent members of the Commonwealth. It is well that we should think at this time of the developments that took place during the 171 years that separate the simple ceremony on the shore of Penang and the more elaborate one in the vast new *Merdeka* (Freedom) Stadium at Kuala Lumpur last year.

The Honorable East India Company, which Light and Raffles served, was an association of merchants who found themselves saddled with the government of vast regions, much against their will, largely as a result of the action of their servants on the spot. They had no desire at all to undertake the responsibility for any more territory in Malaya, and the settlements of Penang, Singapore and Malacca (ceded by the Dutch to Britain in 1824) were outposts of the Company's Indian Empire, valued only as centers of commerce with Southeast Asia and China. A policy of strict non-intervention shut them off from the rest of the peninsula, then sparsely inhabited by Malays engaged in padi-planting and sea-faring, and ruled by a number of petty Sultans.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century the Malays had an undeservedly bad reputa-

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tion for ferocity and duplicity, fostered by generation after generation of Westerners, who met them in the Eastern seas mainly as pirates. It was one of the surprises which awaited the European, when real contact was made, to discover that in fact the Malays were among the most charming and attractive peoples in the world, once their confidence and friendship were gained.

When "John Company" came to an end, after the Indian Mutiny, and the Straits Settlements, as they were called, passed from the control of the Indian Government to the British Colonial Office, in 1867, the policy of non-intervention was changed, in keeping with the new imperialism that was carving spheres of influence for the European colonial powers in Africa, the Far East and the Pacific. The British Government now began to listen to the complaints which merchants and officials of the Straits Settlements had long been making about the disorders in the Malay States, close to the rapidly growing modern towns of Penang and Singapore. The mercantile community in the Settlements had long been vocal about the threat to their trade, and the wasted opportunities for expanding it caused by the primitive and chaotic state of affairs on their doorstep.

In 1874, the first step was taken when, by treaty with the rulers, a British officer was sent to reside in each of the three states of Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan. The rulers undertook to follow the advice of this "Resident" in all matters except those which concerned the Muslim religion and Malay custom. On this curious legal basis the whole structure of British rule in the Malay States was built. In 1896, the four states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang were joined together in a union known as the Federated Malay States. The northern states made similar treaties with Britain when Siam gave up her suzerainty over them in 1909, as also did Johore in 1914; but none of these joined the Federation.

Economic Development

Meanwhile great changes were taking place which led to the transformation of Malaya's economy from a most primitive one to the most prosperous and advanced in Southeast Asia. Most important was the in-

roduction of the rubber tree (*hevea brasiliensis*) from South America, and the use of the mechanical dredge for the mining of tin. As a result of the first, rubber plantations were widely established, both by European-owned companies and by local business men. The dredge, which only the large companies could finance, led to the mining of larger areas, and a greater output than had been possible using the more primitive methods of the Chinese miners. By the First World War, Malaya had become the world's greatest producer of rubber and tin, for which the automobile and the canning of food had created a larger and world-wide demand.

The economic development of Malaya was accompanied by large-scale immigration that changed the character of the population. With the establishment of peace and order, Chinese from the Settlements opened up more tin mining areas in the Malay States, using labor imported from China. In the new towns in every developed area, Chinese also established themselves as traders and shopkeepers. Chinese immigration was greatest in the west coast states of Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan, and in Johore; it was considerable in Pahang and Kedah; and only the east coast states of Kelantan and Trengganu, where development was small, are still overwhelmingly Malay.

Rubber planting led to the importing of laborers from South India, at first indentured, and later voluntarily recruited. Indian labor still predominates on the rubber estates, and in the third and fourth generation Indians have found their way into almost every occupation and into almost all parts of the peninsula.

As a result of this influx of peoples the three million Malays form today a little less than half the population of the Federation (which does not include Singapore). They are slightly outnumbered by the two and a half million Chinese, 600,000 Indians, and 100,000 of other immigrant races. Singapore has a million Chinese in her population of about a million and a quarter.

Britain always recognized the special position of the Malays as the indigenous people. The Malay States were never annexed; the sovereignty of the Sultans has been respected; the prime minister (Mentri Besar)

at the head of the government of each state is a Malay; and the key administrative service has long been open to Malays on equal terms with the British, but until recently closed to other races. Every British official was taught to regard the welfare of the Malays as his primary task. Land has been preserved for the use of Malays in special reservations, and a large part of the money spent on education in the early days went to provide village schools in which Malay children were taught the three R's in their own language.

The Chinese, on the other hand, were left very much to their own devices. Generally they have prospered exceedingly because of their thrift, ingenuity, hard work and business acumen. There were many opportunities for advancement in Malaya's expanding economy, and it was by no means uncommon for the penniless immigrant to become a well-to-do merchant. The Chinese were proud of their achievements but their self-sufficiency and pride in their ancient culture tended to make them cling to their own way of life. There was little to break down the barriers between Malays and Chinese formed by their very different customs, traditions, languages and religions. Still in general, relations between individuals were usually good and often cordial.

Political Organization


Until the Second World War the political organization of Malaya was very complex. Singapore, Penang, and Malacca formed the Colony of the Straits Settlements, ruled by a British governor and nominated councils drawn from all the races. All nine Malay States had their own governments, and in the case of the four Federated Malay States there was a central government superimposed on the state government headed by the British Residents. The unfederated states were more loosely controlled; each had a British Adviser, but he was not the executive head of the government as in the Federated States. Despite this complicated system, effective uniformity was obtained in practice by the over-all power of the Governor of the Straits Settlements, who was also the High Commissioner for the Malay States,

and by the existence of unified British administrative and professional services whose members followed the same general pattern of government everywhere.

In pre-war Malaya there was little political consciousness, and no demand for more democratic institutions. The country was peaceful, prosperous and contented. Relations between the races were good. Then came the storm of war, the rapid defeat of the weak British forces by the Japanese, and three and a half years of occupation and military rule. For almost all Malayans this was a period of privation and disillusionment, leading to a revaluation of all they had previously known. The prestige of the European had suffered a blow from which it could not completely recover until East and West found a new basis on which to meet.

Nationalism, hitherto unknown in Malaya, was aroused, but it was a communal nationalism, Malay, Chinese and Indian, with each community thinking of itself rather than of Malaya. Self-government was now something that might be won in the immediate future, instead of being a vague dream. But who would rule when the British handed it over? Would the Malays take control of their land with the immigrants as non-citizens without political rights? Might not Malaya, with her large Chinese population, become the twentieth province of China? Could Chinese and Indians enjoy the privileges of being Malayans while still remaining citizens of their own countries? All these questions at once became important. Everyone was a little confused and more than a little anxious.

It was fortunate that the British, unlike the Dutch and the French, were able to return to their Asian territories promptly and in force sufficient to stabilize the situation and prevent the spread of communism. After a short period of military rule and rehabilitation, followed by the false start of the Malayan Union, a reasonable constitution was worked out in 1948 for a Federation of Malaya. Singapore remained outside, but the rest of the peninsula was for the first time brought together under an effective central government, without taking away from the constituent states and the settle-



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ments of Penang and Malacca a fair proportion of local autonomy. The new federal and state constitutions provided for the introduction of elected legislatures as soon as possible.

Almost from its inception the Federation has had to fight an armed revolt of Communist terrorists. In 1951, when Sir Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner, was killed, the contest was critical and there were some 7,000 active terrorists making frequent attacks from their jungle hideouts. Probably half a million Chinese and others were either willingly or unwillingly supporting them with food or supplies. But the struggle has been won by Commonwealth

and Malayan forces working together. The "Emergency" is not yet over, but the terrorists are today a discredited remnant of about 1,700, lurking mostly in deep jungle and seldom taking aggressive action. Every month their numbers are reduced by action of the security forces and by surrenders. In most of Malaya life has returned to normal, though there are still a few black spots.

This grim conflict has diverted men and money from much needed projects and from developments in the social services, but in spite of it Malaya has made remarkable progress towards a democratic way of life. Elections have been held, first at a municipal and town council level, then for the state

legislatures, and finally in July, 1955, for the federal legislature. At the first federal elections the Alliance of the three principal racial groups, the United Malays National Organization (U.M.N.O.), the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.), and the Malayan Indian Congress (M.I.C.), carried 51 of the 52 elected seats. The leader of the Alliance, Tunku Abdul Rahman (brother of the Sultan of Kedah), became the Chief Minister, and other Alliance ministers took over portfolios covering nearly all of the functions of government.

A new constitution was then drawn up by an international commission of distinguished jurists and politicians. This has been accepted with minor amendments by the Alliance and the British Government. On August 31, 1957, came the final stage when the charter of independence was presented to Malaya by the Duke of Gloucester, as the Queen's representative, and the new constitution came into force.

Independence

To all thinking Britons and Malayans it is a cause of great satisfaction that all these changes have been worked out so peacefully and so smoothly. Britain should be proud of the task she has carried out in Malaya. Few new countries have started their independent existence with a sounder economic basis and a better trained nucleus of leaders and administrators. Technical skills will be in short supply, but members of the Alliance have expressed their desire to keep for several years the services of those British officials who are willing to stay, and have compensated generously those whose careers have been prematurely ended.

There is still a great fund of good will towards Britain and the first acts of the new state were to remain within the Commonwealth and to sign a treaty of defence providing for the retention of British bases and Commonwealth forces. Such difficulties as there are have come from within, from the deep cleavages which divide the three main races, Malays, Chinese and Indians.

The first of these concerns the language to be used in government, and as the common means of communication between the races.

Up to the present English has been used for all legislation, for government business and in the courts. It has been the medium of secondary and university education, which has produced the leaders of all communities. National feeling is opposed to the continued use of a foreign language not understood by the mass of the people. Some time ago the Federal Legislative Council decided that Malay should be the national language, but much remains to be done before this policy can be carried out.

Language Conflict

At present the Malay language is unsuitable for the precise needs of the lawyer and the administrator, and it does not possess the vocabulary or the flexibility to make it a suitable medium for technical use or for higher education. Although some Malayan Chinese and Indians know enough Malay to use it as a *lingua franca*, they speak it in a debased or "bazaar" form. To the Malays, it is a matter of vital interest, touching their deepest pride and emotions, that Malay should become a real national language. On the other hand the Chinese and Indians, who have been willing to learn English since this has been the key to advancement in the government service and in business, show little enthusiasm for learning to speak Malay correctly. Their national feelings rather incline them to cling to their own languages, which they regard, with some reason, as more advanced than Malay, and as the indispensable means of preserving their own separate culture. They are prepared to accept Malay as the formal language of national ceremony, just as they accept Malay monarchy, but would like to see Mandarin Chinese (Kuo-yu) and Tamil placed as official languages on an equal basis with Malay.

The language difficulty lies at the root of the controversies on education that have troubled Malaya in recent years. If Malay is to be truly the national language, it must eventually become the main medium of instruction in the schools. Up to now English has been the medium in the only schools in which children of all races mingle, and almost the sole medium for all secondary and university education. But the majority of Malayan children attend schools organized

on communal lines using the communal languages, Malays in Malay schools, Chinese in Chinese schools and Indians in Indian schools.

In 1957, a new policy for education was worked out by a committee of the legislature on which representatives of all races sat: It was agreed that the standard primary school should use Malay as the main medium and should be open to children of all races. Chinese and Tamil might be taught to children of those races as subjects, and English would be taught to all. This imposed on the Chinese and Indian children the formidable task of learning three languages at a very tender age. The question of the medium to be used in secondary schools was left open but, in practice, English is still used in multi-racial schools and Chinese in Chinese secondary schools. There is a demand for secondary education in Malay for Malays and this is gradually being provided. These proposals were embodied in a new education law which was accepted by the legislature without any serious opposition.

The sequel has illustrated the tendency of Malayan politicians to agree to far-reaching principles, in order to present unity while independence is secured, and then to proceed to disown them in detail when the policy is worked out in practice. The net result has been a rejection of the Malay-medium primary school by the Chinese and Indians, and their determination to continue to support communal schools for the separate education of their own children. Another complication has been the great increase in Chinese secondary education since the war; all attempts to give these schools a Malayan basis have been resisted, lately with student disorders, as an attack on Chinese culture. Malaya is as far from the establishment of a really national system of education as she ever was.

The question of citizenship has also been difficult. Malays, as the native race, have always been citizens automatically, and have resisted the demands of the Chinese and Indians for equal rights for persons of these races by reason of birth in Malaya. Fortunately, moderate Malay opinion has prevailed and the restrictions on non-Malays acquiring citizenship have been gradually relaxed. All

those born in Malaya after independence will automatically be citizens and time will eventually solve this problem. In the meanwhile it causes some resentment between the races.

A more difficult problem arises from the low economic position of the Malays, who are mostly peasants and fishermen, and have not benefited so much from the great material advances Malaya has made. They have no skill in commerce, which is largely in the hands of Chinese, Indian and European firms. Many Chinese and some Indians are very wealthy, but there are very few rich Malays. As a result there is much discontent among the Malays, and demands are made for special privileges to aid Malay businesses. Much of the best agricultural land is set apart as Malay reservations, and there are special educational opportunities through scholarships exclusively for Malays. The recruitment of non-Malays to the higher branches of the government service is also limited by quotas. These privileges are resented by non-Malays, but are regarded as essential by Malays.

Another problem concerns the union of the Federation and Singapore, which geographical and economic factors would seem to make eventually desirable for both territories. Such a union would enable Singapore to gain complete independence, which she is too small to achieve alone, and it would be generally acceptable to most Chinese. But the addition of the million Chinese in Singapore to the two and half million in the Federation would give them a clear majority. Naturally this is opposed by all Malays in the Federation.

It is a good augury that the leaders of all races in the Federation have cooperated, in a spirit of give and take, in the Alliance government, which has won independence for Malaya. With the examples of Palestine and Cyprus before them, all men of good will shun the dangers of communal strife in Malaya. But the seeds of discord are there, and it will need the highest statesmanship if they are not to grow into a harvest of disorder, such as has plagued the Middle East. Independence has solved none of the basic difficulties of living together in this polyglot country.

Cyprus has strategic value, and "Britain is unwilling to give up any of her responsibilities for her own defense or that of NATO." Unfortunately, as this specialist evaluates the situation, "for the Cypriots the world is small and bounded by the shores of Cyprus." Here, "The Greeks must fight the British and the Turks must fight the Greeks."

Uneasy Cyprus

BY ALZADA COMSTOCK

Professor Emeritus of Economics, Mount Holyoke College

THE troubled island of Cyprus, now a British crown colony, is a small piece of land that has been tossed back and forth among the reigning powers for most of its 5,000 years of recorded history. It possesses only 3,572 square miles and a little more than half a million people; but it lies, as many another bit of land has professed to lie, at one of the crossroads of the world. Situated in the northeast corner of the Mediterranean, about 50 miles from Turkey, 60 miles west of Syria, 240 miles north of Egypt and the Suez Canal, and 500 miles from Greece, it has always offered a temptation to stop and conquer.

Racially, the population of Cyprus is a mixture of the nations which at various times in its history have occupied or possessed it. Linguistically, about four-fifths of the population are Greek-speaking and nearly all of the remainder Turkish-speaking. Politically, the ball is in play again: Greece, which now demands the island, is a NATO member; Turkey, which now asks for the partition of the island, is a NATO member; a third NATO member, the United Kingdom, now controls the island as a colony and carries the main burden of maintaining NATO bases and other defenses in the eastern Mediterranean. Logistically, in the event of attack from the semi-encircling Soviet Union, Turkey wants Cyprus in

strong and friendly hands. Civilly, the island has become a seething pot of anti-British and Greek-Turkish riots.

Here is no major tragedy of screaming international injustice, but instead, a series of odd situations. Relatively few people, whether British or Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, have actually been killed, in spite of the interminable raids and riots and ambushes; and yet the United Nations, the United States, India, the Soviet Union and other peacemakers or fomenters of trouble are eternally concerned with Cyprus. Through all the disturbance, intensified since 1955, the people of the island have continued to prosper, especially in their industry and mining. True, the tourist business has fallen off, but British financial contributions continue and the budget is still balanced. In spite of the recent Greek Cypriot terrorist movement for *enosis* (union with Greece), this island has never belonged to Greece in any political sense and Greece is remote from the neighbors who feed it and trade with it. Almost no Cypriots emigrate to Greece but many go annually to England.

Waves of Conquest

Little is known of the large population and apparently well-developed culture of the island before 3,000 B.C. Since that time the foreign rulers of Cyprus have been successively the Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Alexander the Great, the successors of Alexander (ruling from Egypt), the Roman Empire, Byzantium (i.e., the eastern Greek-speaking half of the Roman Empire ruling from what is now Istanbul), the Arabs, Richard I (England), the Lusignan Dynasty (French, titular kings of Jerusa-

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lem), the Genoese, and the Venetians, who surrendered Cyprus to the Turks in 1571.

The Greek influence in Cyprus apparently began with the introduction of Mycenaean culture and industries late in the Bronze Age. This influence was strong enough to eliminate the well-developed art and culture which preceded it. The Greek dialect of Cyprus still shows resemblances to that of Arcadia, with which connections must have been broken by the twelfth century, B. C. The Cypriot script shows similar relationships. These factors, together with the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Byzantine period, account for the sympathies of Greek-speaking Cypriots today, in so far as the adventitious incitements of the Church of Cyprus and Left-wing movements may be left out of account.

The Turkish administration which began in 1571 lasted for three centuries. In 1878, Turkey assigned the island to Britain, in exchange for a British commitment to come to the aid of the Ottoman Empire in case of a Russian attack—a Turkish position which is curiously like that of Turkey today. The Turks remained nominal sovereigns, with an annual tribute of £92,800.

When Britain and Turkey entered World War I on opposite sides, Britain formally annexed the island. In a proclamation issued at that time it was announced that every Turkish subject on the island would become a British subject unless he gave notice in writing of his wish to retain Turkish nationality. Almost all of the Turks, with the exception of a few temporary residents who were non-Cypriots, accepted the decree without overt objection; while the Greek-speaking Cypriots accepted British nationality with apparent enthusiasm.

British sovereignty over Cyprus was recognized by both Turkey and Greece in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The island was formally made a colony, with a governor and legislative council, in 1925. Britain made an annual grant-in-aid of £50,000 for finances. Gradually the administration of this largely Greek-speaking island became more difficult. The legislative council was abolished in 1931 and the constitution suspended. A new constitution, proposed by Britain's Labor Government in 1948, would have led to

almost complete self-government, but it was rejected by the Cypriots in a plebiscite held in 1950, in which 95 per cent voted for union with Greece. In the campaign both the Church of Cyprus and the Communists were active in working against the British proposals.

Promoters of Enosis

Immediately the *enosis* campaign began to gather the momentum which was to make Cyprus an international issue. A Right-wing delegation, led by the Church of Cyprus, was sent to Athens, London and Lake Success (where the United Nations was then based) to plead the cause of union with Greece. The Communist espousal of *enosis* was new and represented a tactical right-about-face. After losing ground in the elections of 1949, when they asked for self-government for Cyprus on the ground that anything was better than union with the Greek "monarcho-fascists," policy demanded—and Moscow may also have demanded—that "if you can't lick 'em, join 'em." So the Communists also sent a delegation abroad, theirs to go to eastern European capitals to work for *enosis* and against "British imperialism."

In 1951 the Cyprus problem entered the field of international politics, where it has become an increasingly disturbing element. Greece notified the United Kingdom of its intention to claim sovereignty over Cyprus. The Turkish press insisted on Turkey's claim to the island as an integral part of the Anatolian peninsula. But at this stage caution was shown by both Greece and Turkey. The Middle Eastern situation was critical. Britain, France, and the United States, by a tripartite declaration in 1950, had guaranteed the *status quo* of the Arab-Israel frontiers pending a peaceful settlement. British bases on Cyprus were already established.

Year by year the tension increased, internally and externally. The Church encouraged civil disobedience and the Left-wing movements began to organize short strikes. In 1952, Iraq and Jordan suspended trade with Cyprus as part of their campaign to strengthen the Arab blockade of Israel. The question of another plebiscite reached

the General Assembly of the United Nations, where it was endorsed. In April, 1955, the newly organized National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (E.O.K.A.), the underground pro-enosis movement, undertook the campaign of small bombings, riots, strikes and sabotage which has persisted except for a truce which began in March, 1957, and later became a truce in name only.

Since the beginning of 1957, the campaign has been complicated by the increased hostility of Turkish Cypriots to Greek Cypriots. Anti-Greek riots have been staged by the Turkish community, which has come to demand nothing less than partition. There have been less easily explicable murders of Greek Cypriots by other Greek Cypriots and occasional rebukes of Greek Cypriots by Athens.

The Church and Enosis

The active part taken by Archbishop Makarios in the E.O.K.A. movement and his exile by the British in 1956 can be understood only against the background of the historic role of the Greek Orthodox Church, or, fully, the "Holy Orthodox Catholic Apostolic Eastern Church," to which the Church of Cyprus is related, although it is autocephalous (independent). In churches of the Greek Orthodox rite, political and fiscal power traditionally accompany religious authority.

The Greek Orthodox Church was the official form of the Christian religion in the eastern Byzantine half of the Roman Empire after Christianity was officially adopted. Although Cyprus had no political ties with any part of the Greek-speaking world after the twelfth century, Greek survived as the language of the ritual of the Church of Cyprus, as it did in popular speech. The Turkish administration utilized the traditions of the Church of Cyprus, and made the Archbishop and the bishops responsible for assessing and collecting taxes. When the British took over the island in 1878 they substituted a civil fiscal administration, although the Archbishop entered a protest against his loss of personal revenues. Church domination of secondary education continued.

To the Cypriot mind there was therefore nothing questionable in Archbishop Makarios' promoting any Hellenistic movement he pleased, with money or bombs or whatever implements came to hand. In 1951, soon after the movement for union with Greece became an active force in Cyprus, the Archbishop founded a youth organization (PEON) which formed a nucleus for the terrorist organization of later years, the National Organization of Cypriot fighters (E.O.K.A.). After the British administration had accumulated evidence that the Church was collecting funds for financing the campaign of violence and that the Archbishop was personally furnishing money for smuggling arms into Cyprus and was directing the terrorist campaign through E.O.K.A. leader George Grivas, deportation was decided upon. On March 9, 1956, Archbishop Makarios was exiled to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean.

The Archbishop's year of exile was punctuated by continued and more ingenious acts of violence in Cyprus and by increasingly repressive measures on the part of the British administration; even though, in the midst of it all, Lord Radcliffe was appointed Constitutional Commissioner and instructed to frame a workable constitution for Cyprus. On March 14, 1957, E.O.K.A. leaders offered a truce if the Archbishop were released. Terms were presented to the Archbishop, who then issued a statement appealing to E.O.K.A. to cease operations and to the British Government to abolish the existing state of emergency.

On March 28, the Archbishop was released, with permission to go anywhere he wished except to Cyprus. On April 5, some of the emergency regulations were relaxed. The truce lasted actually only until October, 1957, although it was nominally in effect for many months thereafter. The Archbishop's travels in the months following his release took him to Greece, Great Britain and the United States. On February 13, 1958, at the conclusion of British-Greek talks in Athens, the newly appointed Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, called on Archbishop Makarios in his Athens hotel and talked with him for more than an hour. Cypriots continued to make the Archbishop's

return to Cyprus a condition for any concessions to the British.

The logic of Communist activities in Cyprus is far more obscure, and of course international communism has no natural roots on the island. The original Communist program did not include union with Greece, but it soon proved advantageous to include *enosis* in party policy. The obvious contradictions were tactically unimportant. The Greek Government is anti-Communist, and what could happen to Cypriote Communists under Greek rule is interesting to speculate upon. The Church of Cyprus is anti-Communist, but occasionally the reins slip where local political activity is concerned, with the result that the Communists have become a second important political group (in opposition to the Church) and have had considerable success in municipal elections.

The Communists appear to have shown the Orthodox Church how to manipulate modern tools of political agitation. The Church, by forestalling the emergence of modern democratic tendencies, has created a climate favorable to communism. Far apart as they are, the Church seems willing to utilize communism anywhere if it seems likely to benefit the terrorist movement, while the Communists in turn hope to benefit by the unrest generated by the Church and the terrorist movement.

In the trade union movement there is an old and well-established Communist body (P.E.O.). This section of the movement is exempt from the many restrictions imposed on the Cyprus Workers' Confederation or New Trade Unions, which openly identifies itself with nationalist aspirations. The older Communist organization has more than twice as many members as the new organization, which is affiliated with the international body, the I.C.F.T.U., but the C.W.C. membership is more youthful and possibly more energetic.

Again and again agencies of the United Nations have tried to solve the Cyprus problem. Faced with five resolutions in February, 1957, four of them controversial, the United Nations General Assembly simply adopted (unanimously) one offered by India asking for continued negotiations and a

peaceful solution. Greece pressed the issue of self-determination for Cyprus in the session of the General Assembly beginning in the autumn of 1957. The Greek resolution won a majority vote in December, but failed of passage because a two-thirds majority was required.

Diplomatic attempts by the British Government to ease the problem of Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean produced a conference of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Greece and Turkey in London in the late summer of 1955. The conference was suspended on September 7, after British proposals for self-government for Cyprus, as opposed to the self-determination demanded by Greece, failed to satisfy either Greece or Turkey. Turkey argued that if any change were made the possession of the island must revert to Turkey. The Turkish Foreign Minister said:

In all the course of history the fate of Cyprus has remained attached to that of the peoples settled in the Anatolian Peninsula. . . . If the Island was once part of the Hellenic world, it was only because at that time Anatolia was within the orbit of the ancient Hellenic civilization; if it once belonged to Byzantium, it was only because Byzantium held sway over Anatolia; if Cyprus was once under the sway of the Latin Empires, it was only because at the time the Latins aspired to rule over Anatolia. . . . It was also thus that the Ottomans established their sway over Cyprus. . . . It owes its present standard of living to being part of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth; the foodstuffs which it needs are produced in great abundance in Turkey; and when during the Second World War, the supply lines of Great Britain to the Island were severed Cyprus lived on the resources of Turkey.

The conference was a complete failure. The British had put forth proposals for a liberal constitution; an assembly with an elected majority; with a proportionate quota of seats reserved for the Turkish community; a ministry with a proportion of portfolios provided for the Turkish community; and a tripartite committee of the three powers which would act as a standing body for consultation and cooperation among the three governments on Cypriot problems. They were displeased when the proposals were

described by the Greek foreign minister as the negation of democracy and a "mockery."

It was in January and February, 1958, that serious talks among the three powers were again attempted. By this time the Turkish community in Cyprus was engaged in a series of anti-Greek riots organized by their own new resistance movement, the T.M.T. Unpublicized talks in Ankara in January between British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd, Cyprus Governor Sir Hugh Foot, and Turkish authorities apparently reinforced the recent Turkish position that partition of Cyprus was the only workable answer to the problem. This they considered more reasonable, in view of the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, than a demand for the return of the island to Turkey.

Selwyn Lloyd and Sir Hugh Foot then held talks in Athens. Apparently nothing was accomplished. By this time British patience was wearing thin, in view of the urgency of settling the Cyprus dispute, and Greece and Turkey were advised to abandon their passive attitudes of sitting back and waiting for somebody else to do something, which they would then oppose.

Britain is unwilling to give up any of her responsibilities for her own defense or that of NATO. Cyprus is still a useful air base, even though it is no longer utilized to protect British supply bases in the Suez Canal Zone, for those have been seized by the Egyptians. Turkey is afraid to see Cyprus' military strength weakened, for then she would be even more vulnerable to Russian attack. Although Greece has offered, in debates in the United Nations, to let Britain keep the Cyprus bases if union with Greece should come about, Greek suggestions of another nature to Arab and Iron Curtain countries have given the British little confidence in the offer.

A British withdrawal from Cyprus might, in the opinion of some Turkish Cypriots, result in civil war on the island and a rupture of relations between Greece and Turkey, with disastrous effects on NATO. It would also have important political effects in the Middle East, especially in Iraq and the Persian Gulf Area, where British influence is still important. Iraq, with Pakistan, supported the Turkish position on Cyprus at

the meetings of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact in Ankara in January, 1958.

The constitution offered by Lord Radcliffe in December, 1956, could not now be considered by the Greek Cypriots, who call it "colonial," or by the Turkish Cypriots, who will settle for nothing less than participation if any change is to be made. That constitution provided for a self-governing Cyprus under British sovereignty, with foreign affairs, defense, and internal security reserved to the Governor. Gradually the British position has been modified, but there has been no corresponding conciliation on the part of the islanders.

In 1957, Britain replaced the Governor, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, with a civilian, Sir Hugh Foot, who has made many personal gestures of friendship to the Greek community and who has called on Archbishop Makarios in Athens. But the so-called "truce" maintained by E.O.K.A. remains scarcely recognizable as such, and Sir Hugh has had to warn the people that he intends to perform his duty of maintaining order.

Apparently the British are now ready to give up Cyprus as a crown colony if the Greek Cypriots would give up *enosis* and the Turkish Cypriots would give up participation. They would accept a self-determination plebiscite if it barred union with Greece. They would demand bases on the island, available to NATO for the protection of NATO countries and the Middle East. They would demand international guarantees of the rights of the Turkish minority. If a period of self-government under British auspices preceded the plebiscite, as would almost certainly be necessary, they would ask for a secular basis, without the Church rule to which the Muslim Turks object.

But for the Cypriots the world is small, and bounded by the shores of Cyprus. The Greeks must fight the British and the Turks must fight the Greeks. The establishment of a unitary state, under international guarantees and with international supervision of minority rights, which seems to many outsiders to furnish the only road to peace on the island and amity between Greece and Turkey, is not within their myopic vision.

Received At Our Desk

Of War and Peace—

UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. By PAUL KECSEKEMETI. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958. 258 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

For scholars and students who have tried to evaluate the effectiveness of the "unconditional surrender" doctrine of World War II, this excellent and concise study will be welcome indeed. Paul Kecskemeti discusses such questions as the origin and the reason for the dominance of the unconditional surrender goal, its implications for the victors as well as the vanquished, its effect on the surrender situation and on the war's aftermath. Although he doubts that the formula prolonged the war with Germany, the author notes that "the rules of unconditionality prevented the Allies from handling surrender situations in the most efficient and expeditious manner."

The "rules of unconditionality" included the "no negotiation rule" and the "no recognition" or "vacuum rule"; the reason for the vacuum, as Kecskemeti understands it, was that "to the morally oriented Allies, any abatement from the strict rules of unconditionality meant that some element of the evil past would survive after the losers' surrender and make their victory meaningless and worthless." The insistence on a political vacuum in Germany, Italy and Japan was a negative attitude that led to post-war difficulties. "Permanent peace," notes this scholar, "rests on a weak foundation indeed if it depends on the undying memory of a just chastisement. This, however, was the foundation we prepared for it by adopting the unconditional surrender policy."

In his concluding chapter, the author evaluates the changes in surrender strategy and in war aims implied in the concept of nuclear war, in which "the winner must take into account the loser's ability to un-

leash a last orgy of destruction." As a result, "in nontotal nuclear war, the final political payoffs must be moderate; in general, such wars can leave no room for extreme settlements." Because of the risk of a suicidal last battle, "insistence on total surrender [would be] prohibitively risky for the winner."

Of total war, Kecskemeti writes that: "powers may seek to survive in the nuclear age, either by going to extremes of inhumanity and malevolence never imagined before, or by drastically limiting their expectations of gain from the application of armed power." He believes that Americans will rule out the former alternative and hopes that in the nuclear age we will be willing to accept compromise solutions and relinquish "extreme, ideal solutions" in the interest of our own survival.

WAR AND SOCIETY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By SIR GEORGE CLARK. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958. 150 pages, appendix and index, \$3.50.)

Five of the six chapters of this book were originally lectures; the sixth appeared first in the *Cambridge Historical Journal*. Sir George Clark examines the significance of war in the seventeenth century: its influence on the emergence of modern Europe, the attitude of contemporaries toward war. It is his contention, well supported in his study, that war was regarded by most seventeenth century thinkers as a necessary phenomenon of society and that only unjust war was evil. Of considerable interest is his thesis that the seventeenth century warfare was brutal and marked by considerable cruelty, not the "gentlemen's sport" that is sometimes portrayed. Late in the century, however, as "international relations of all kinds became more orderly" the rules of warfare became regularized also. Clark's

concluding chapter deals with the cycle theories of war and peace. He believes that "By no ingenuity can the historical process, as this [Western] tradition understands it, or as the diplomatic historians record it, be interpreted as a cyclical process." This stimulating collection of essays provides valuable commentary on the philosophy of the seventeenth century.

WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW. By GRENVILLE CLARK and Louis B. SOHN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. 524 pages and index, \$7.50.)

After seven years of intensive study, the authors offer in explicit detail a revision of the charter of the United Nations and a step by step plan for disarmament. "A prime motive for this book," writes Grenville Clark in the introduction, "is that the world is far more likely to make progress toward genuine peace, as distinguished from a precarious armed truce, when a detailed plan adequate to the purpose is available, so that the structure and functions of the proposed world institutions may be fully discussed on a worldwide basis." This book merits careful study and wide discussion; most of its pages are specific point-by-point revision suggestions and procedures for disarmament, for the establishment of a world development authority, for a U.N. peace force (with nuclear arms) and for a revenue system for the United Nations.

"Virtually the whole world" is to accept permanent membership in the revised U.N., and those who refuse to join shall be bound by disarmament regulations in any case. A full-time professional Peace Force of between 200,000 and 600,000 men is to be made up of volunteers, "recruited mainly but not exclusively from the smaller nations." A reserve force of up to 1.2 million will be partially trained and subject to call. The full-time force will be "stationed proportionately throughout the world. . . ."

The disarmament process is precisely outlined, calling for a one year transition period, followed by a "preparatory state" of two years, and an "actual disarmament

stage" of 10 years, during which there would be a step-by-step proportionate reduction in all categories of all national armed forces and all armaments at the rate of ten per cent per annum." Continuing U.N. inspection is provided for.

Is this a visionary plan? Grenville Clark thinks not. Because of the horrifying destructive power of nuclear arms, he believes that the time for "complete national disarmament under enforceable world law" is almost ripe. When will this be? Clark notes that in 1957-58 "the Soviet Union is already almost surrounded by a ring of bases from which nuclear bombs could be launched by plane or missile in such volume that all urban life could soon be destroyed." When similar pressure is brought to bear on the West—and is that time not now?—"the time will be ripe for the serious consideration of the sort of plan advanced in this book. . . ."

This study can be read with profit by all those interested in the survival of world society and of man himself.

MASTERS OF DECEIT. The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight It. By J. EDGAR HOOVER. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958. 374 pages, glossary, bibliography, appendices and index, \$5.00.)

In alarmist, sensational and emotional language, J. Edgar Hoover paints a prosaic and trite picture of Communist espionage in the United States. His description of Communist activities in the United States lacks the drama and intensity found in Whitaker Chambers' *Witness*.

In the opening chapters of the book the author provides a short history of Communist doctrine and of the growth of Communism and the Communist party in the United States. At no time does he feign an objectivity towards the teachings of Marx and Lenin. Nor does he put into perspective the activities of the Communist party in 1958. It is hard to believe, for example, that the Communist party in the United States, as Mr. Hoover alleges, can dictate to American labor unions.

Current Documents

Soviet Suspension of Nuclear Tests

On March 31, 1958, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko announced to the Supreme Soviet Moscow's decision to halt nuclear weapons tests. Reprinted below are the pertinent passages from his address:

Comrade Deputies:

The Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. has submitted for the consideration of the first session of the Fifth Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. the question "concerning the termination of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons."

I have been instructed to inform you about the considerations which guided the U.S.S.R. Government in taking this step.

You know that the Soviet Union has invariably stood for a complete and unconditional ending of nuclear weapon tests. Our country has for several years now been urging the United States and Great Britain to conclude an agreement on this question. Unfortunately, however, the Soviet Union is to this day the only country from among the powers possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons that is prepared to sign without any delay an agreement that would put an end to test explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

The Soviet Government attaches great significance to such an agreement, inasmuch as tests of nuclear weapons affect the vital interests of the Soviet people as well as of every person in every country and every part of the world.

It goes without saying that we realize that the ending of tests would not fully remove the danger of atomic war. Therefore, while advocating the ending of test explosions, we at the same time clearly declare that we consider it to be our principal aim to reach agreement with other powers on the unconditional banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons of all kinds, ending production thereof and completely destroying the existing stockpiles of these weapons with proper control.

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain, however, as yet display

no readiness to accept that, although such a step on the part of the three powers which have developed nuclear weapons would have won them the gratitude of all mankind. Inasmuch as it has not been possible so far to reach agreement on banning and destroying nuclear weapons, the Government of the U.S.S.R. sees a way out in taking appropriate partial measures which to some degree will help to safeguard mankind against the fatal consequences of the present nuclear armaments race. It regards the ending of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons as the most urgent measure toward this end.

The task of stopping test explosions of weapons of these types is not a narrow technical problem. It is a problem of great political and moral international importance because every month, every week that the solution of this problem is delayed is used to the detriment of the interests of peace by those forces who would like nations to get stuck more deeply in the mire of preparations for atomic war.

What is the purpose of the tests of atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs and of other kinds of nuclear weapons? There can be only one answer and no one is making a secret of that.

The purpose and meaning of these explosions is to develop new, even more destructive and deadly weapons of mass extermination, and not in the last turn to study the conditions of the use of these weapons in actual combat.

But this very fact continually increases the danger looming over mankind—the danger of a rocket-nuclear war. Who doubts that if an end is not put to atomic and hydrogen weapon tests there will be no hope of checking the further nuclear armament race?

Is it not a fact that as soon as one side carries out a series of test explosions this spurs the other side, which hastens to do

likewise in order not to fall behind? This, too, cannot be overlooked.

It is well known that in an effort to find an excuse to reject an agreement to terminate nuclear tests, responsible quarters in the United States have been contending of late that the purpose of these tests is to develop "clean" nuclear bombs of some kind with reduced radioactivity. The supposed properties of these "clean" bombs are extolled in the United States in such touching terms that one might think they were talking about means designed to benefit mankind and not about means of mass extermination of human beings.

While leaving to the conscience of those who make such claims the question whether there is any reason to think that it would be more pleasant for people to die from a "clean" hydrogen bomb, even were it possible to develop such a bomb, than from a "dirty" bomb, one should point out that artificial arguments about "clean" nuclear weapons are designed to divert attention from the principal point.

A statement issued by a group of eminent American atomic scientists justly says that the world has now to choose not between a "clean" or "dirty" hydrogen bomb but between atomic war and a world relieved from the horrors of nuclear weapons. This is exactly how the question stands now.

They say that the termination of nuclear tests would make more complicated the position of those Western politicians who, playing with fire, stake on the threat of using atomic and hydrogen bombs and have given these weapons the high-sounding but essentially false name of a "deterrent." These politicians are trying to make the peoples believe that these weapons in their hands are almost a most reliable guarantee of peace.

* * *

The opponents of the ending of nuclear tests see danger in the fact that such a termination would bring nearer a complete and final ban on nuclear weapons and their destruction. But this is not the weak but the strong point of this demand.

If the termination of nuclear weapon tests serves as a check to the brandishing of these weapons and to adventurous policy, if it comes as a cold shower to the biggest "hot-

heads" in NATO military headquarters, this alone would be a great boon to peace. It is a fact that scientists, military and political leaders realize perfectly well that the development of nuclear weapons has attained such a level that the explosion of one or two hydrogen bombs can destroy everything or nearly everything living on the territory of quite a sizeable European state, and that these bombs can be delivered almost instantaneously to any point on the globe by means of rockets. Such is the situation today. It requires no great flight of fancy to imagine what the world will come to if the perfection of nuclear weapons is to continue.

Where is that optimist who could in good faith claim today that the accumulation of atomic and hydrogen weapons is beneficial to the cause of peace while the termination of the development of ever more destructive weapons is harmful? If in the West there are some responsible statesmen who really think so, one should say that they are obviously blinded by illusions and are incapable of grasping the gravity of the present situation. This is a great tragedy for the peoples of those countries, the policy of which is guided by such leaders, and a great danger to the cause of peace.

Nuclear tests are harmful not only because they increase the danger of a war with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons. These tests are harmful in themselves in view of their harmful effect on human health. A serious warning to this effect has been given in the petition signed by 9,235 scientists from forty-four countries submitted early this year to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Eminent scientists of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, India, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Norway and other countries who have signed the petition urge an immediate agreement to end nuclear bomb tests. Scientists throughout the world whose opinion should be regarded as most competent on this question express great alarm over the continuing explosions of nuclear weapons and protest against their continuation.

* * *

Let us assume, however, that the actual hazards to man from test explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons are not pre-

cisely known, that there is only a great risk of these tests having a fatal effect on the health of those living now and their offspring. Let us assume that the probability of this is only 50 or, say, 25 or even 10 per cent. Even if so, do we have the right not to take such a risk into account when the fate of millions upon millions of human beings is at stake? Evidently not a single statesman, not a single government can ignore this unless they have lost all sense of responsibility before the peoples.

Neither can one overlook the fact that to some Western leaders, especially in the United States, the termination of nuclear tests spells danger to the economy of the Western countries.

They say outright that they fear lest such a message lead to a dislocation in the economic life of these countries, or to be more specific, lest it result in the loss by big monopolies of the fabulous profits derived from war production in general and from the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons in particular.

In the United States one hears voices sometimes warning the American State Department against the danger of an agreement with the Soviet Union. But, firstly, least of all this department is distinguished for such a property as readiness for agreement with the Soviet Union; secondly, it is pertinent to observe that stubbornness is not the best thing in diplomacy; thirdly, what is most important, the danger to the economy of Western countries comes not from terminating nuclear weapons tests or from the ending of the armaments race but from militarization which has caught in its vise the entire economy of the member states of the Atlantic bloc.

In the light of the facts today, there is every reason to expect that the higher the militarization of the economy of these countries, the more precipitous will be its crash into the economic abyss. Is it not a fact that the atom and hydrogen bombs have not saved 5,300,000 Americans from unemployment in the United States today?

In order to halt the dangerous nuclear armaments race, to safeguard human health from the consequences of atomic and hydrogen explosions, there should be no more

nuclear tests. No matter what objections are raised by the opponents of this initial step toward removing the danger of an atomic war, it could be carried out quite easily along with the undeviating observance of an international agreement to terminate nuclear tests. The real worth of the arguments which are extensively propagandized in the West about the alleged difficulty and well-nigh impossibility of controlling the tests is evident from the following example. Recently we learned from the American press that the Atomic Commission of the United States in order to substantiate its statements concerning the impossibility of detecting some nuclear explosions, specifically those made underground, actually cited grossly minimized figures on the conditions of detection of such explosions over long distances and withheld for a long time from the public the scientific information which it possessed and which proved the very opposite—the full possibility of control.

The Soviet Government is known to have proposed in the United Nations that an international commission be set up to observe the fulfillment by states of their commitments to end atomic and hydrogen weapons tests and that under its direction control posts be set up on a mutual basis on the territories of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Britain and in the Pacific area, including Australia.

When even this proposal of the Soviet Union failed to induce the statesmen of the United States and Great Britain, who talked so much about control, to agree at last to end the tests, it became clear even to the most credulous people that what mattered was not control at all but the reluctance of definite circles of Western powers to restrict the nuclear armament race. There have never been any other obstacles to the termination of tests.

It is now comparatively easy to achieve an agreement on terminating nuclear weapons tests also for the reason that there are objective possibilities for this, namely, that there are only three countries—the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain—that possess and manufacture these weapons. Consequently, the point is that these three powers should reach agreement and then the ques-

tion will be settled. Incidentally, one of these powers—the Soviet Union—has long since proclaimed its full readiness to subscribe to an agreement to end tests without hedging it by any other questions or complicating terms.

It is hardly necessary to argue at length that if after a while the number of countries manufacturing nuclear weapons increases, it will be much more difficult to reach agreement to end the tests and terminate the nuclear arms race in general. This is one more reason in favor of solving the questions of ending tests now before there are additional difficulties in this way.

Sometimes one may hear that Britain needs continued atomic and hydrogen weapons tests because she is lagging behind in this sphere and wants to overtake the Soviet Union and America. A strange argument! Indeed, is there any guarantee for Britain in case nuclear tests continue that she will overcome her lag and not fall behind even more? A race is a race, and evidently in this case all parties would try hard not to relinquish their lead.

* * *

In these conditions the hopes for "closing the gap" are not very reliable and it is at least unreasonable to base serious policy on such a shaky foundation.

The ending of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons would halt the further spreading of these weapons, preventing any more countries from being drawn into the nuclear arms race, which, certainly, would in itself, be a factor for peace.

On the other hand, the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests can and must be the first step, that very gesture of mutual confidence between the powers which all the peoples are so eagerly awaiting. A termination of these tests everywhere would, no doubt, have an instant and most favorable effect on the over-all international situation. It would help reduce the danger of atomic war which is depressing the human race and would pave the way to the solution of other international problems and, in the first place, of other questions of disarmament.

These are, Comrade Deputies, the reasons why the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet Government regard the termi-

nation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons as the most timely and urgent problem of the day. It is for this very reason that the Soviet Government has put the question of ending these tests without delay at the top of the list of questions which it proposes for discussion at an international conference at the summit. Moreover, the Soviet Government suggests that it should be considered as an independent item and in the first place without waiting for agreement on the other aspects of disarmament to be reached between the powers.

Since the United States and Great Britain have not shown themselves willing to agree to a final and unconditional cessation of tests, we suggested that the tests should be suspended at least for two or three years so that, with the international situation improved, agreement could be reached on a final solution of this problem and, perhaps, on the whole problem of banning the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons.

What has been the reply from the Governments of the United States and Great Britain?

While not venturing on an open opposition to the Soviet proposal to end tests, they chose the method of obstructionism, piling one obstacle on top of another in the way to the implementation of this proposal. The Western powers made the ending of tests contingent on the achievement of agreement on one or another aspect of disarmament and that, in addition, concerned far more complicated issues—agreement on which was more difficult than agreement to end nuclear tests, also because of the position of the same powers.

The Soviet Union's proposal for the ending of tests has also been discussed in United Nations agencies, including the General Assembly. But here, too, the attitude of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain made itself felt.

Verbally, nearly all the delegations were in favor of the proposal for the immediate ending of nuclear tests, but as soon as it came to voting the delegations of many countries dependent on the United States, particularly those bound by obligations under various military bloc arrangements, created by the Western powers, felt too weak, as it were,

to raise their hand against the position of the United States.

As a result, the competition in the manufacture of more and more types of nuclear weapons and the attendant test explosions of these weapons, far from coming to an end, are assuming a wider scope which is daily increasing the peoples' fear of tomorrow. And every time a mushroom cloud, now familiar to many, shoots up over the islands of the Pacific, the inhabitants of Marshall Isles, Japan and other countries of the Pacific area shudder with indignation at the thought that they might suffer the same lot that befell the utterly unsuspecting Japanese fishermen who were showered by a rain of radioactive dust resulting from the American H-bomb experiment. The gap between the Governments which are reluctant to renounce nuclear tests and world public opinion, which has long since made clear its attitude to such tests, is growing wider and more obvious.

* * *

Determined to make the utmost contribution to achieving the great objective of ridding mankind of the nuclear war menace, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. submit the proposal to the Supreme Soviet that the Soviet Union unilaterally cease tests of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons, as the first step in this direction.

In putting forward this proposal, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. acts on the assumption that this noble initiative of the Soviet Union, which is bound to meet the aspirations of millions upon millions of people in all lands, will be instrumental in improving the whole international situation and will be echoed accordingly by other nations possessing nuclear weapons and testing them.

If these nations, to wit the United States of America and the United Kingdom, join the Soviet Union in resolving to cease atomic and hydrogen weapon tests, then the problem which is the source of deep concern to the peoples will at last be solved and nuclear test explosions will be stopped everywhere for good and all.

It goes without saying that if the governments of other countries in possession of nuclear weapons cold-shoulder this initiative

of the U.S.S.R. and react to it by continued test explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Union will have to guide itself by its own security interests in its further action with regard to nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union, striving to reduce international tension and guiding itself by the principle of peaceful co-existence with all countries, has more than once taken unilateral action in reducing its armed forces and armaments. In the post-war years, the U.S.S.R. has at its own free will relinquished the military bases it had on foreign territories under international agreements. The Soviet armed strength was reduced by 1,840,000 men from 1955 through 1957 and one more cut—by 300,000 is now being effected—in accordance with a decree by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

One is compelled to state, unfortunately, that this has still not been reciprocated by the North Atlantic bloc powers, which base their policies, instead, on stepped-up war preparations.

All kinds of false arguments, such as the fable-like stories about "joint control" over rocket bases which the United States is setting up on the soil of their West European "allies," are being put forward to reassure the people of the countries involved in these preparations. Can one indeed believe that, should the quarters shaping NATO policy launch an atomic war, any role will be played by consent or opposition of the governments and parliaments, say, of Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium or Holland to the launching of American rockets from their territories or to the dropping of nuclear bombs already loaded on American bombers based on those territories?

It should be stated unequivocally, Comrade Deputies, that if the organizers of all these war preparations reckon that disarmament will continue to be the unilateral concern of the Soviet Union while the Western powers will be building up their armaments, then this is wrong calculating. The only basis for disarmament is honest agreement taking into account the security interests of all the parties concerned. This is why the Soviet Government, while submitting to the Supreme Soviet session the proposal for this

country's unilateral termination of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests, expects the United States and Great Britain to make a similar decision and thus make a contribution of their own to restricting the nuclear arms race and reducing the atomic war danger.

* * *

One can well imagine what a far-reaching influence on the entire development of international relations would be brought to bear by an agreement between the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain to end tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Viewed

against the background of the present tension and rivalry in the production of all types of weapons, a practical step taken in common by the powers to limit dangerous war preparations would be of enormous value, indeed, it would be welcomed by the peoples as evidence of a shift in international developments in favor of greater confidence and peaceful cooperation of nations. It is the Soviet Government's conviction that this shift can be started by the ending of nuclear tests everywhere.

* * *

The United States View of Test Suspension

On March 31, 1958, the United States State Department replied to the Soviet announcement to halt nuclear weapons tests. The text of this statement is reprinted below in full:

The Soviet statement about nuclear testing will, of course, be studied in detail. But some general observations can be made at once.

The Soviet statement comes on the heels of an intensive series of secret Soviet tests. They should arouse world opinion to the need to deal in an orderly and dependable way with the testing and related aspects of the disarmament problem.

Soviet official propaganda incessantly seeks to create abroad the image of a peace-loving Soviet Government. But that same Government openly defies the United Nations with respect to both the substance and the procedure of disarmament.

The Charter of the United Nations gives that organization broad authority with reference to principles of disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

In the exercise of that authority the United Nations General Assembly has, by an overwhelming vote, approved the comprehensive first-stage disarmament proposal and called on the nations concerned to begin at once technical studies as to how these proposals might be carried out.

These studies include the studies needed for a supervised suspension of nuclear testing. The United States stands ready instantly to respond to that resolution. But the Soviet Union refuses to comply.

The same General Assembly reconstituted

and enlarged its Disarmament Commission. The United States wants that commission to carry out its mandate. But the Soviet Union boycotts the commission.

The Charter makes the Security Council responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armament. The United States has recently proposed to the Soviet Union that this responsibility be discharged. But the Soviet Union refuses to cooperate.

The Soviet Government declines to deal with the subject of armaments in any of the several ways prescribed by the United Nations Charter.

It prefers elusive formulations of its own.

It is elemental that free nations which want to remain free will not, and should not, forego their indispensable collective capacity to deter and defend against aggression merely in reliance on a Soviet statement of intentions for which there is no system of verification, which can be evaded in secrecy and altered at will.

The United States again calls on the Soviet Union to deal with the vital problem of disarmament in an orderly way, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to which the signature of the Soviet Union is affixed. That Charter constitutes a solemn agreement. If it is nullified by the Soviet Union, why should the world place confidence in new Soviet engagements?

U. S. and Soviet Resolutions on Arctic Flights

On April 18, the U.S.S.R. accused U.S. bombers of flying, armed with nuclear weapons, across the Arctic region toward Soviet borders. On April 29, the Security Council began consideration of resolutions proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union relating to the possibility of surprise attack over the Arctic. The full texts of the American and the Russian resolutions follow:

The U. S. Resolution

The Security Council,

Considering further the item of the U.S.S.R. of 18 April, 1958,

Noting the development, particularly in the Soviet Union and the United States of America, of growing capabilities of massive surprise attack,

Believing that the establishment of measures to allay fears of such massive surprise attack would help reduce tensions and would contribute to the increase of confidence among states,

Noting the statement of certain members of the Council regarding the particular significance of the Arctic area,

Recommends that there be promptly established the northern zone of international inspection against surprise attack, comprising the area north of the Arctic Circle with certain exceptions and additions, that was considered by the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee of Canada, France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States during August, 1957;

Calls upon the five states mentioned, together with Denmark and Norway, and any other states having territory north of the Arctic Circle which desire to have such territory included in the zone of international inspection, at once to designate representatives to participate in immediate discussions with a view to agreeing on the technical arrangements required;

Decides to keep this matter on its agenda

for such further consideration as may be required.

The Soviet Resolution

The Security Council,

Having examined the question submitted by the Soviet Union concerning "urgent measures to put an end to flights by United States military aircraft armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union,"

Considering that the practice of making such flights increases tension in international relations, constitutes a threat to the security of nations and, if continued, may lead to a breach of world peace and the unleashing of an atomic war of annihilation,

Calls upon the United States to refrain from sending its military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs toward the frontiers of other states for the purpose of creating a threat to their security or staging military demonstrations;

Mindful of the necessity for taking steps as soon as possible to avert the threat of atomic warfare and ease international tension, the Security Council notes with satisfaction that preliminary talks are in progress between the interested states with a view to the convening of a summit conference to discuss a number of urgent problems, including the question of drawing up measures to preclude the danger of surprise attack, and expresses the hope that the summit conference will be held at the earliest possible date.

The Suez Compensation Agreement

Representatives of the United Arab Republic and the stockholders of the Suez Canal Company signed a preliminary agreement on April 29 on compensation for Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. The complete text follows:

The representative of the Government of United Arab Republic [as successor to the Government of Egypt] and the representa-

tives of the Suez stockholders, namely, the shareholders, the holders of founder shares and the holders of the Parts Civiles [Société

Civile pour le Recouvrement des 15 pour cent des Produits Nets de la Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez Attribues au Gouvernement Egyptien] herein-after referred to as "the stockholders" have agreed to the following heads of agreement:

First, as full and final settlement of the compensation due to shareholders and holders of founders shares as a consequence of the nationalization law number 285 of 1956 and in full settlement of claims of the holders of the Parts Civiles, the Government of the United Arab Republic will make a payment equivalent to 28,300,000 Egyptian pounds and will leave all the external assets to the stockholders.

Secondly, in consideration of the above, the stockholders will accept responsibility for all liabilities outside Egypt as of July 26, 1956, including liability for the service of the outstanding debentures [principal and interest] and for pensions in accordance with paragraph 4b below.

Thirdly, the Government of the United Arab Republic will continue to assume responsibility for all liabilities within Egypt as of July 26, 1956, including liability for pensions in accordance with paragraph 4a below.

Fourthly, (a) the Government of the United Arab Republic will assume liability for pensions as follows:

1. Pensions already granted as of July 26, 1956, and being paid by Egypt to pensioners resident in Egypt on the date of signature of the present heads of agreement.

2. Pensions accruing to staff who were employed in the service on July 26, 1956, and who are still in service of the Suez Canal Authority or who, having remained in the Authority's service, retired on pension after that date in accordance with regular pensions regulations.

(b) The stockholders will assume liability for all pensions other than those specified in (a) above.

(c) Each party to these heads of agreement will afford facilities for the preparation of lists of individual pensioners falling within the various categories mentioned in this paragraph 4, in order that liability for payment of pensions to each individual may be properly determined.

(d) The stockholders will pay to the Government of the United Arab Republic the capital value of the pensions payable to persons who, having remained in the Authority's service after July 26, 1956, retired on pension after that date in accordance with regular pensions regulations but ceased to reside in Egypt prior to the date of signature of these heads of agreement, and who, at the date of signature of these heads of agreement, do not receive their pensions from the stockholders.

(e) Liability for pensions after the date of signature of these heads of agreement will not be affected by any subsequent change of residence by a pensioner.

Fifthly, the payment specified in Paragraph One will be made as follows:

A. An initial payment of 5,300,000 Egyptian pounds through retention by the stockholders of the transit tolls collected in Paris and London since July 26, 1956.

B. The balance in instalments as follows:

January 1, 1959,	4,000,000	Egyptian pounds.
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January 1, 1960,	4,000,000	Egyptian pounds.
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January 1, 1961,	4,000,000	Egyptian pounds.
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January 1, 1962,	4,000,000	Egyptian pounds.
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January 1, 1963,	4,000,000	Egyptian pounds.
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January 1, 1964,	3,000,000	Egyptian pounds.
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Sixthly, the instalments specified in Paragraph 5 (b) above will be free of interest and will be payable in pounds sterling in London or in French francs in Paris calculated at the fixed rate of 2.8715576 United States dollars to one Egyptian pound. Not less than 40 per cent of each instalment shall be payable in pounds sterling.

Seventh, (a) if the Government of the United Kingdom provides a special release from Egypt's No. 2 sterling account for the specific purpose of making an advance payment on the instalments specified in paragraph 5 (b), the amounts so released will be paid over forthwith by the Government of United Arab Republic for application to the payment in advance of the two next

maturing instalments specified in paragraph 5 (b).

(b) In event of a release by the Government of the United Kingdom of the total of Egypt's No. 2 sterling account, the Government of the United Arab Republic will pay over forthwith an appropriate amount of the funds so released for application to the payment in advance of the two next maturing instalments specified in paragraph 5 (b).

(c) If either of the releases under (a) and (b) above takes place before the effective date of the final agreement referred to in paragraph 9 below, the appropriate amounts will be paid over forthwith on the effective date.

Eighthly, the conclusion and implementation of the final agreement referred to in paragraph 9 will be done in such a way that the rights and liabilities attributed to the stockholders under the present heads of agreement are effectively exercised and assumed by an entity acceptable to both parties as representing regularly all the stockholders and duly qualified to give full and final discharge to the Government of the United Arab Republic.

Ninthly, in view of the fact that present

heads of agreement have been negotiated under the good offices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the bank having accepted the capacity of the signatories for purposes of concluding the present heads of agreement, the parties hereby request the bank to continue its good offices until the conclusion and documentation of a final agreement implementing these heads of agreement, and to act as fiscal agent for the purpose of receiving and paying out the monies provided for in paragraphs 4 (d), 5 (b) and 7 above.

Done in triplicate, in Rome on 29 April, 1958, in the presence of a vice president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. One copy to be retained by the Government of the United Arab Republic; one copy to be retained by the representatives of the Suez stockholders; and one copy to be deposited in the archives of the International Bank.

On behalf of the United Arab Republic:
ABDEL GUELIL EL EMARY.

On behalf of the Suez stockholders: J. GEORGE-PICOT, CHARLES M. SPOFFORD, JOHN FOSTER.

Witnessed by: W. A. B. ILLIFF, Vice President, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

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The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Conference of Independent African States

April 15—The first conference of independent African states opens in Accra, Ghana.

April 21—Egypt, The Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Ethiopia, Ghana and Liberia, meeting at Ghana, adopt a common foreign policy pledged to "nonentanglement" with either of the great power blocs.

April 22—The conference ends with an appeal to the great powers to stop producing and testing nuclear weapons.

Disarmament

April 2—U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower says that the Soviet decision to stop nuclear testing is a "gimmick" that should not be "taken seriously."

April 3—President Eisenhower asks the Departments of State and Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission to review U.S. disarmament policies within three weeks.

April 4—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev asks President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to "prove their good intentions" by giving up further nuclear tests.

April 6—It is revealed in Moscow that Khrushchev has written notes to the U.S. and Britain asking them to halt nuclear tests.

April 8—U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold welcomes the Soviet move to halt nuclear weapon testing.

President Eisenhower asks Khrushchev to agree to study methods of arms inspection, in a letter replying to the Soviet note on nuclear test suspension.

April 9—President Eisenhower says he will "very seriously" consider stopping nuclear weapons tests after the scheduled U.S. summer series is finished.

The U.S. plan for atomic test suspension is discussed by Secretary of State Dulles; it includes stationing squads of inspectors on land, sea and in the air all over the world, with the right to check on suspected explosions.

April 11—The Second Pugwash Conference of nuclear scientists from East and West ends; leading American and Russian scientists agree that fear and suspicion block disarmament agreement.

April 26—The U.S. asks the Security Council to discuss international control of bomber flights over the Arctic. (For further information see page 365 of this issue.)

April 28—President Eisenhower asks the U.S.S.R. to support the American proposal for international inspection in the Arctic zone.

April 29—Dag Hammarskjold supports the U.S. resolution calling for international inspection of the Arctic to protect all nations against surprise attack. (For further information see page 365 of this issue.)

East Europe

April 10—East German, Polish and Czech foreign ministers meet in Czechoslovakia to try to prevent the atomic rearmament of West Germany.

April 12—A communiqué issued by the 3 countries meeting in Prague urges the West to withhold atomic arms from West Germany; proposed instead is the Polish plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

Nato

April 16—Meeting in Paris, the NATO defense ministers accept the proposal for doubling the number of divisions in Europe to 30 and adding nuclear weapons to their arsenal as a basis for planning, to be discussed with home governments.

April 17—The defense ministers approve a master five-year defense plan for the NATO nations. Details are not worked out.

United Nations

April 15—The United States offers to extend the territorial sea limit from three to six miles as a compromise because of opposition at a U.N. conference at Geneva on the law of the sea.

April 18—The U.S.S.R. asks the Security Council to meet at once to take up Russian charges that U.S. bombers armed with nuclear weapons are making polar flights toward Soviet territory. (See also *Disarmament*.)

April 21—The U.S.S.R. withdraws its request that the Security Council hear its charges against U.S. planes because the U.S. proposed an immediate vote on the subject.

The U.S. endorses a U.N. proposal for a U.N. Economic Commission for Africa but does not wish to join the Commission.

April 22—The U.S.S.R. expresses a desire to join the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa.

April 24—The U.S. reveals that 14 nations will be invited to send witnesses to its nuclear tests in the Pacific in the summer of 1958.

April 25—The U.N. conference on the law of the sea fails to agree on an acceptable limit for territorial waters.

April 27—The U.N. conference at Geneva adopts an article that in effect upholds Israel's right to send ships into the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, voting 62 to 1.

April 29—Voting unanimously, the U.N. Economic and Social Council sets up an economic commission for Africa. The council votes 12 to 6 against inviting the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to join the 8 independent African states on the commission.

ARAB FEDERATION, THE

April 3—Jordan takes control of petroleum supplies within its borders.

April 9—The government approves 12 constitutional amendments to delegate some of King Hussein's powers to King Faisal of Iraq, head of the Arab Federation.

ARGENTINA

April 26—President-elect Arturo Frondizi, it is reported, promises the nation's workers a general wage increase after he takes office on May 1.

BELGIUM

April 17—The Brussels Fair is officially opened by King Baudouin. Forty-one nations, the Vatican City, international organizations and commercial exhibitors are participating.

BRAZIL

April 5—Refugees from the drought stricken northern area have been fleeing south since the emergency began a month ago. It is announced that President Juscelino Kubitschek has signed a new credit relief bill for 600 million cruzeiros to meet this crisis.

April 23—U.S. Air Force transports are expected tomorrow to participate in an air lift to drop food in the northern famine area.

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Ceylon

April 9—Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike broadcasts an announcement that he is abrogating an agreement he made with Tamil-speaking leaders in July, 1957, giving some limited rights for the use of the Tamil language officially in Tamil areas.

The House of Representatives approves a bill providing that all plantations be nationalized. The Government says that such a plan could not be immediately effected.

April 11—Tamil-speaking minority leaders start a nonviolent civil disobedience campaign.

April 20—The Communist-led Public Service Workers' Trade Union Federation strikes for more political rights and a decrease in the cost of living; 15,000 to 20,000 public workers strike; troops and armed policemen patrol the streets of Colombo.

April 26—The Government warns public employees to return to work. Union leaders say strikers number more than 125,000.

Great Britain

April 2—The House of Commons votes 292 to 251 to allow women to join the House of Lords. The measure has already been adopted by the House of Lords.

April 3—Sir Winston Churchill arrives home; he is reported to have recovered from pneumonia and pleurisy.

April 9—Churchill cancels his visit to the United States.

April 15—Chancellor of the Exchequer Derick Heathcoat Amory offers Parliament a budget without major changes in policy.

April 25—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan says that nuclear weapons tests must continue.

India

April 3—Reporting to the Security Council, U.N. Representative Frank P. Graham says that India has rejected all his proposals for settling the Kashmir dispute.

April 16—Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon supports India's largest military budget in Parliament, requesting about \$640 million.

April 29—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru announces that he would like to be relieved of the daily burdens of the office of prime minister. He says he will leave the final decision to his Congress party.

April 30—It is revealed in New Delhi that Sheikh Abdullah, former Prime Minister of Kashmir, has been arrested and returned to prison as a "hazard" to the security of the state. After four and a half years in prison the Sheikh was freed January 8.

Union of South Africa

April 14—An African strike aimed for election week is called off, partly because of the threat of police opposition.

April 15—White South Africans vote for members of the twelfth Parliament of the Union.

April 19—It is reported from Johannesburg that Prime Minister Johannes G. Strijdom's Nationalist party gained seven seats

in Parliament and a majority of the votes cast in the April 15 elections. Strijdom views this as a victory for his policy of apartheid.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Malta

April 1—In London, Parliament approves the Government's action delaying integration with Malaya for five years.

April 6—Premier Dom Mintoff warns that NATO will be ousted from Malta if Britain fails to give Malta the promised \$14 million to strengthen Malta's economy.

April 21—Dom Mintoff resigns with his Cabinet; the Cabinet members "no longer want to remain responsible for public peace and order."

April 24—Governor Sir Robert Laycock takes over day-by-day control of Malta's administration after accepting Mintoff's resignation.

April 25—The General Workers Union calls for a 24-hour general strike as a "national protest."

April 28—Governor Laycock suspends the right of public assembly for three months after a violent one day strike.

April 30—Governor Laycock declares a state of emergency and orders harsh penalties for attacks against island policemen.

West Indies Federation

April 12—Lord Hailes, Governor General, announces the appointment of 19 members of the first Federal Senate.

April 18—Sir Grantley H. Adams is elected first Prime Minister of the Federation, with a vote of 25 to 19. Adams is the former Prime Minister of Barbados.

April 20—Prime Minister Sir Grantley Adams announces the formation of his 11-member Cabinet.

April 22—Princess Margaret, acting for Queen Elizabeth, inaugurates the first Parliament of the Federation.

BURMA

April 27—Newspapers report that Prime Minister U Nu has ousted Minister of

Home Affairs Takin Tha Khin and taken over his ministry.

April 30—Premier U Nu declares that the leaders will avoid an "armed conflict" despite the split in the ruling Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League.

CAMBODIA

April 11—It is reported that the caretaker government of Premier Penn Nouth has resigned.

April 19—Former Premier Sim Var agrees to form a Cabinet.

April 24—Premier Sim Var's Cabinet is invested by the National Assembly.

CHINA (Nationalist)

April 5—President Chiang Kai-shek declares that his government may end diplomatic relations with Japan if that country gives full rights to a Communist Chinese trade group.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

April 10—The Peking radio announces that production of light industry doubled during the first Five Year Plan (1952-1957).

April 13—China breaks off a \$196 million trade agreement with Japan, and accuses the Japanese government of hostility; i.e., Japanese non-recognition of the Red China government.

COLOMBIA

April 1—A rift develops between Liberals and Conservatives on the choice of their joint presidential candidate.

April 12—Liberals and Conservatives try to pick a joint candidate for the presidency satisfactory to both parties. They extend their political truce for 16 years.

April 16—Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo is chosen joint presidential candidate by Liberals and Conservatives.

April 24—Dr. Lleras accepts the joint nomination.

COSTA RICA

April 3—The election tribunal, which has been investigating returns from the February elections for President and Congress, makes a final decision. The results are:

President-elect Mario Echandi wins by a slight margin; in the Congress, Echandi's National Union party wins 10 seats; Liberation party, 20; Republican party, 11; Independent party, 3; Civic Revolutionary Union, 1.

CUBA

April 1—Rebel leader Fidel Castro's threat to start an all out "total war" against the government today causes transportation to come to a virtual halt in Camaguey and Oriente provinces.

April 5—An Army communiqué reports that the Army has cut off "the principal [rebel] group."

April 6—President Fulgencio Batista declares that the rebel forces of Fidel Castro will eventually be destroyed. He says that it may be a lengthy operation because the government does not wish to put all its strength into the campaign and thus endanger the lives of the residents in Sierra Maestra.

April 7—Official reports reveal that fighting between rebel and government forces has intensified in the last 48 hours. The Army also declares that a C-46 plane, carrying supplies to the rebels, has been shot down.

April 9—Fighting begins in Havana as rebels attempt a general revolutionary strike. Forty insurgents are killed in fights with police and soldiers.

April 10—Order is restored to Havana following yesterday's gun battles and failure of the strike.

April 17—President Batista and his Cabinet approve a decree making critics of his regime liable to punishment.

April 26—Constitutional guarantees are suspended for another 45-day period by the government.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

April 18—Joseph Roche Jacyno, commercial attaché in the U.S. Embassy, is expelled on spy charges.

April 21—The U.S. orders the removal of Dr. Roman Skokan, commercial attaché at the Czech Embassy in Washington, to retaliate for the expulsion of Jacyno. No charges are made against Dr. Skokan.

EGYPT (See the *United Arab Republic*)**FINLAND**

April 25—A new caretaker government headed by Reino Kuuskoski is established to serve until the July 6 elections. Former Premier Rainer von Fieandt and his non-party government were defeated on their agricultural price program.

FRANCE

April 1—One million workers in public utilities and public transportation strike for higher wages. An estimated 3 million non-striking workers are prevented from getting to their jobs, creating an almost complete economic halt.

April 3—It is predicted that by mid-summer France will have enough kilograms of plutonium to produce an atomic explosion, thus becoming the fourth nation to enter the atomic power arena.

April 12—The French government agrees to reopen talks with Tunisia following the French-Tunisian rift of February 8 when French planes bombed the village of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef. The National Assembly is recalled from its vacation to ratify the government's decision. (See also *Tunisia*.)

April 16—By a vote of 321-255 the National Assembly rejects the government's decision to resume negotiations with Tunisia. Premier Felix Gaillard resigns.

April 18—General Maurice Gustave Gamelin, who fought in both world wars, dies.

April 21—President René Coty invites former Premier Georges Bidault to form a new Cabinet. Bidault favors a tough policy towards Tunisia.

April 22—President Coty calls on former Premier René Pleven to form a new government when Bidault is unable to muster enough support.

April 26—René Pleven's attempt to get a parliamentary agreement on Algerian policy before asking for approval of his new government is dubbed "unconstitutional" by speakers of both houses of parliament.

April 28—Pleven agrees to try to form a new

government after obtaining support and agreement on Algerian policy.

FRENCH EMPIRE**Algeria**

April 20—The Independent African nations meeting in Ghana recognize Algeria's rebel National Liberation Front as the only legitimate government of Algeria.

April 27—French troops and planes attack a village in eastern Algeria, killing 215 rebels.

April 28—at a conference in Morocco, delegates from the Moroccan Istiqlal party, the Tunisian Neo-Destour party, and the rebel Algerian National Liberation Front issue a communiqué outlining agreement on a practical program to achieve Algerian independence.

April 30—at the Moroccan conference of Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan delegates, a final communiqué is released proposing the formation of a revolutionary Algerian government in exile.

Togoland

April 28—It is announced that the National Unity party, advocating independence for Togoland, wins a sweeping victory in elections held yesterday: it takes 29 of the 46 Legislative Assembly seats.

GERMANY (West)

April 8—Moscow and Bonn sign a trade repatriation agreement following 8 months of negotiations. The Soviet Union promises to consider the repatriation applications of German citizens in the Soviet Union prior to the German invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941.

April 9—A strike of 180 thousand steel workers in the Ruhr is avoided by a compromise wage increase. Workers are to vote later on the terms of the agreement.

April 16—Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, in London, meets with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan for talks on East-West relations.

April 18—Macmillan and Adenauer issue a joint communiqué proposing that a sum-

mit conference discuss the questions of disarmament and German reunification. (See also the *U.S.S.R.*, April 5.)

April 25—West Germany and the U.S.S.R. sign 3 trade pacts. Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan, signing for Moscow, tells German authorities that the Soviet Union would never drop nuclear bombs, even in the event of atomic war, on Germany if it rejects nuclear arms.

April 28—Mikoyan ends the first Soviet official visit to West Germany with a recommendation for closer ties between the countries.

HAWAII

April 19—The sugar strike with a 13,000-man walkout by members of the International Longshoremen's Union goes into its 79th day with no end in sight.

HUNGARY

April 2—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev arrives in Budapest for the Liberation Day celebration on Friday. He tells the Hungarian people that they have nothing to fear so long as the Soviet Union is their friend. (See also the *U.S.S.R.*)

INDONESIA

April 6—Negotiations for purchase of military equipment including bombers from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia are successfully terminated.

April 7—The U.S. State Department expresses regret over the purchase of Communist arms by Indonesia "for possible use in killing Indonesians who openly oppose the growing influence of Communism in Indonesia." This statement is interpreted by Indonesians to indicate support for the Sumatran rebels.

Hand grenades are thrown at revolutionary headquarters at the rebel capital at Bukittinggi.

April 8—Foreign Minister Subandrio reiterates his nation's request to purchase \$120 million of U.S. arms. U.S. Secretary Dulles declares that neither the Indonesian government nor rebels will receive U.S. arms.

April 13—Five warships arrive off the coast

of Padang, a rebel stronghold. Planes strafe the area in preparation for an attack by the Army.

April 14—The Indonesian military cuts off a rebel supply line to northwest Sumatra.

April 15—Japan and Indonesia exchange instruments of ratification for the Japanese-Indonesian peace treaty, signaling the restoration of diplomatic relations. Japan agrees to pay \$223 million in reparations over a 12-year period.

April 17—It is reported that government troops have landed in western Sumatra and are moving towards Padang.

April 20—Government troops moving towards Bukittinggi meet heavy rebel resistance.

April 25—Premier Djuanda announces that Army troops are within 12 miles of the rebel capital at Bukittinggi.

April 28—Diplomatic sources report that Indonesian pilots are sent to Egypt to learn how to operate planes ordered from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

ISRAEL

April 8—Israel resumes work on the Lake Hula drainage project following a U.N. survey establishing a new boundary along the Syrian-Israeli demilitarized border zone. Israel has agreed to change the course of one of the drainage canals.

April 21—The Israeli-Jordanian Mixed Armistice Commission meets to consider Jordan's complaint concerning a military parade which Israel is planning in Jerusalem as part of its tenth anniversary celebration. Jordan charges that massing of troops and tanks violates the 1949 armistice.

April 23—Jordan and Israel agree to permit U.N. observers in both the Israeli and Jordanian sectors of Jerusalem because of tomorrow's parade.

April 24—Israel celebrates the tenth anniversary of its founding with a military parade.

ITALY

April 11—The Left-wing Socialist newspaper, in a front page editorial, refuses to join

in a popular front with the Communists in the election scheduled for May 22.

JAPAN

April 9—The Japanese government approves a private trade agreement of March 5 between Communist China and Japan. Japan agrees to allow the Chinese Communist mission to fly the Red China flag.

April 25—Premier Nobusuke Kishi dissolves the House of Representatives in preparation for the elections scheduled for May 22.

JORDAN (See the *Arab Federation*)

KOREA

April 9—The 16 nations who fought in the Korean war ask Communist China and North Korea to elaborate their proposal for free elections under a neutral commission to unite Korea.

April 25—The withdrawal of 80,000 Chinese troops from North Korea is completed.

LEBANON

April 1—It is reported that 4 are killed and a minimum of 10 are wounded when anti-government (and anti-Western) rioting flares in Tyre in the south of Lebanon.

April 20—A dynamite blast occurs near the residence of Premier Sami es-Solh. It is believed that the explosion was meant to frighten participants from the Premier's traditional reception celebrating the close of the Muslims' month of fasting.

LIBYA

April 27—The Libyan Cabinet is reorganized: Foreign Minister Wahbe Buri and Justice Minister Hamid Dibany retain their ministries.

MOROCCO

April 1—It is reported that Spain and Morocco agree to allow the Southern Moroccan Protectorate to be ruled by Morocco.

April 16—King Mohammed V dissolves the cabinet of Premier M'barek Bekkai. The expulsion is caused by the Premier's meeting yesterday with a coalition of Opposi-

tion leaders; the Premier gave his approval to their resolution criticizing the government.

April 20—Spain is requested to remove all its troops from Morocco. This action is precipitated by Spanish refusal to withdraw from Villa Bens in the Southern Protectorate so recently placed under Moroccan control.

NETHERLANDS

April 29—Defense Minister Cornelis Staf tells parliament that if other nations also refused, the government would reconsider the stationing of intermediate range missile bases on its territory.

PARAGUAY

April 2—Two rebels and 2 soldiers are killed; an attempted revolt against the government of President Alfredo Stroessner is thwarted.

PERU

April 5—Following the resignation of 2 ministers yesterday, President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche reorganizes his Cabinet.

POLAND

April 21—At the thirteenth anniversary of the Polish-Soviet alliance, Polish leaders hail ties with Moscow.

April 14—At the opening of the Polish Trades Union Congress, the United Workers (Communist) party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka declares that workers' councils must yield to a larger type of organization more amenable to party control.

April 15—Official speeches by leaders at the Trades Union Congress support the replacement of the workers' councils by more tightly controlled units.

April 29—Minister of Culture Karol Kuryluk is ousted from his post. This is interpreted as a move to end freedom and liberalism in the arts.

SAUDI ARABIA

April 19—Crown Prince Faisal, Saudi Arabian Premier, asserts that his country will join with neither the United Arab Re-

public nor the Arab Federation, but that it will cooperate with both groups.

SPAIN

April 5—The 10-day "go slow" strike in Barcelona terminates with the exception of 6 factories employing some 20,000 persons. April 15—Parliament approves a bill to allow direct negotiations concerning wages between unions and employers.

SWEDEN

April 25—The lower house of the Riksdag defeats a bill for pension reforms by a vote of 117-111.

SYRIA (See the *United Arab Republic*)

TUNISIA

April 2—The U.S.-British good offices team arrives in Paris to try anew to settle French-Tunisian differences.

April 4—President Habib Bourguiba rejects the French proposal for international supervision of the Algerian-Tunisian border. April 8—A French customs inspector intercepts a Tunisian diplomatic shipment of radio equipment allegedly bound for the National Liberation Army in Algeria.

April 9—Premier Felix Gaillard of France confers with the U.S.-British good offices team. He calls the vacationing Cabinet into session.

April 10—The U.S. announces that it will supply Tunisia with 20,000 tons of wheat under an emergency program.

April 11—The U.S. and Britain warn Premier Gaillard against taking his conflict with Tunisia before the U.N. Security Council.

April 17—Bourguiba declares that he will take the French-Tunisian conflict before the U.N. but that he will defer such action momentarily until the new Cabinet has been formed.

April 24—Bourguiba drops his plan to press Tunisia's case against France before the U.N. Security Council.

U.S.S.R., THE

April 1—The Soviet Union regrets the U.S. reaction to nuclear test suspension is

"hasty." It charges that Washington's reasons for not following the Soviet lead in halting nuclear tests are artificial. (See also International, *Disarmament*.)

April 5—Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev tells steel workers at Szatalinvaros, a rebel center in the 1956 Hungarian uprising, that they cannot depend on the Soviet Army to intervene in the event of another rebellion. The Hungarians are told that they must become strong so that they will not have to depend on Soviet assistance in case of a repetition of 1956.

Khrushchev declares that neither East Europe nor German unity are issues to be discussed by the heads of state at a future summit conference. (See also *West Germany*, April 18.)

April 7—Premier Khrushchev predicts that the U.S. is destined for second place in the race for world leadership.

April 8—Khrushchev reverses his position taken before the Szatalinvaros workers: he declares that Hungary's Communist party will receive the support of the entire "Socialist camp" in the event of another revolt.

April 10—The Soviet Union proposes a meeting with U.S. and European trade chiefs to promote East-West trade.

April 11—at the meeting of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, it is observed that Soviet delegates are anxious to purchase Western equipment and goods.

In similar notes to Britain, France and the U.S., the U.S.S.R. urges that a preliminary meeting to prepare for a summit talk begin next week. It proposes a foreign ministers meeting for mid-May to precede a top level heads-of-state meeting.

April 14—Texan born Van Cliburn takes first prize in the international Tchaikovsky piano competition sponsored by Moscow.

Moscow announces that Sputnik II has disintegrated in the atmosphere after 5 and one-half months. It was launched last November 3.

April 18—Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko charges the U.S. with flying nuclear armed bombers over the Arctic.

- zone near Soviet borders. He raises the question in the U.N. Security Council which has decided to take up the issue. (See also International, *United Nations*.)
- April 21—The Soviet work day is cut to 6 hours in underground mines and 7 hours in heavy industry, including steel.
- April 22—In a speech by a member of the Communist Party Presidium, Yugoslavia is told to give up its erring ways and maintain Socialist unity.
- The U.S. and Britain reject the Soviet plan for a meeting of trade ministers.
- April 26—The Kremlin refuses to accept the U.S.-British-French proposal that their foreign ministers meet jointly. The Soviet Union maintains that separate meetings between Gromyko and each of the other 3 foreign ministers will produce the best results in preparing a summit talk. The Western nations think it useless for their foreign ministers to call on Gromyko to discuss the same problem.
- April 28—Former Premier Georgi M. Malenkov is accused by Khrushchev as responsible for the troubles besetting Soviet agriculture.
- April 29—Egyptian President Nasser arrives in Moscow as a state guest.
- April 29—Diplomatic authorities reveal that the West will not permit Poland and Czechoslovakia to participate in an East-West heads of state meeting.
- UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE**
- April 3—Suez Canal tolls are ordered to be paid in the currency of the country under whose flag the ship is sailing. This is interpreted as a move to obtain more dollars as many ships fly flags of convenience of countries within the dollar area.
- April 3—President Gamal Abdel Nasser announces that 3 new submarines, purchased from Poland, have arrived to make his submarine fleet the strongest in the Middle East.
- April 7—President of the World Bank Eugene R. Black, following a conference with Nasser, announces that the World Bank will assist Egypt with plans to increase the capacity of the Suez Canal.
- April 12—It is reported that for the last 3 days the Cairo radio's anti-American attacks have ceased.
- April 16—The United Nations selects the Belgium Banque de la Société Générale to collect the 3 per cent surcharge imposed on ships using the Suez Canal. This charge is for the repayment of the \$8 million spent to clear the Canal following the Israeli-British-French attack in 1956.
- April 22—The Ministry of Finance announces that agreement has been reached with representatives of the Universal Suez Company concerning compensation for shareholders because of nationalization of the Canal.
- April 29—In Rome representatives of the shareholders of the Universal Suez Canal Company and the United Arab Republic sign a preliminary compensation agreement. The shareholders receive, under the terms of the agreement, £28,300,000 Egyptian over a 5-year period. (See page 365 of this issue.)
- UNITED STATES**
- The Economy**
- April 1—President Eisenhower signs a \$1.85 billion emergency housing bill.
- April 4—The President declares that the two per cent down payment requirement for mortgage loans guaranteed by the Veterans Administration is no longer required.
- April 14—Former President Harry Truman urges a \$5 billion tax cut for middle and low income groups.
- The Federal Reserve Board reports that the current recession is the worst of three post-war slumps, as the decline in the index of industrial production reaches 11.7.
- April 20—Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks says that he thinks the recession has touched the bottom of the slump.
- April 22—The Administration sends Congress 4 suggestions for long-range solutions for railroad difficulties; it is also suggested that the federal government guarantee an immediate temporary loan of up to \$700 million.
- April 23—The Bureau of Labor Statistics

reports that the Consumer Price Index rose to a record level in March.
April 29—Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks reveals that from mid-March to mid-April unemployment declined from 5,198,000 to 5,120,000.

Foreign Policy

April 2—It is publicly revealed that about 10 days ago the State Department imposed an embargo on arms shipments to Cuba.
April 7—U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson begins to discuss "questions connected with preparation for a summit conference" with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.
April 12—Senator Hubert H. Humphrey says that an underground explosion in the U.S.S.R. of March 25 was detected 5000 miles away in Nevada.
April 13—Senator Humphrey, Chairman of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee, announces that the subcommittee is going to explore the possibility of ending nuclear weapons tests.
April 15—Secretary of State John Foster Dulles says that the U.S. is prepared to discuss hemisphere price problems with other Western Hemisphere nations.
April 16—Notes from the U.S., Britain and France are delivered in Moscow noting that these Western powers are ready to start diplomatic preparatory talks tomorrow.
April 17—Secretary of State Dulles says that an atomic disarmament agreement is impossible unless the U.S. is willing to share nuclear weapons secrets with its allies.
April 18—The U.S. says that it will be glad to let the U.N. discuss the Russian charge that American nuclear-armed bombers have made "provocative flights" across the Arctic toward the U.S.S.R.
The State Department warns foreign embassies and legations to check on employees who may be profiteering in tax-free merchandise.
April 22—The Department of Commerce reports that in 1957 non-military foreign aid grants totalled \$1.6 billion, compared with \$1.737 billion in 1956.

April 23—The State Department reveals that the U.S.S.R. has refused to set up technical groups to study disarmament controls.

April 24—In identical notes, the U.S., Britain and France ask the U.S.S.R. to take immediate practical steps toward a serious summit conference.

April 27—Vice-President Richard Nixon flies to Trinidad to start an 18-day goodwill trip in South America.

April 30—The Treasury Department announces that the U.S. will release the funds of the Universal Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian government that have been frozen since July, 1956. This action, scheduled for tomorrow, is to be taken in the light of the preliminary agreement signed in Rome for compensation to the canal company's stockholders. (For the text of this agreement see page 365 of this issue.)

Government

April 1—The Justice Department begins a grand jury investigation of automobile dealers' price fixing agreements, in Washington, D.C.
April 3—Congress approves a measure to put \$1.8 billion in new federal and state funds into highway construction.
April 4—A congressional investigating panel notes some "highly improper" activities undermining public confidence in the Federal Communications Commission.
April 8—Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerfield says that 918 new post offices have been started or will be started by early fall at a cost of approximately \$49,245,000.
April 15—President Eisenhower vetoes legislation authorizing \$1,704,028,300 for rivers, harbors and flood control.
April 16—Despite misgivings, the President signs legislation authorizing \$1.8 billion for highway construction.
April 18—Treason charges against 72-year-old poet Ezra Pound are dismissed so that he may return to Italy. Pound has been under indictment since 1945 for treason but the case has never been tried because the poet was found insane.
April 29—Republican Senator Ralph E.

Flanders, 77-year-old Vermonter, announces that he will not be a candidate for re-election in November.

April 30—A Federal grand jury in Milwaukee indicts three large natural gas companies and their principal officers on charges of criminal violations of antitrust laws.

Labor

April 7—In six cities, radio and television technicians strike against the Columbia Broadcasting System in a contract dispute.

April 24—The United Automobile Workers' international executive board approves a 10 per cent wage cut for its top officials.

April 25—The Senate votes 53 to 37 against Senator William F. Knowland's proposal to broaden a labor fund-reporting bill into general union control legislation.

April 28—Voting 88 to 0, the Senate adopts a union welfare and pension fund reports bill, making embezzling and false reports federal crimes.

General Motors and the Ford Motor Motor Company refuse to accept the United Auto Workers suggestion to extend labor contracts three months; they suggest a two-year extension of current contracts.

April 29—The Interstate Commerce Commission rules that truckers and railroads may not refuse service at a plant because of labor disturbances.

General Motors says that it will end its current contracts with the U.A.W. on May 29.

Military Policy

April 2—President Eisenhower suggests a civilian-controlled agency to direct government explorations of space.

The President asks for an additional \$1.4 billion in defense appropriations for the 1959 fiscal year.

April 3—The President proposes a drastic reorganization of the Defense Department.

An A.E.C. study reports a 50 per cent increase in fall-out of radioactive strontium on New York City in 1957.

April 4—A group of scientists and philoso-

phers including Linus Pauling and Bertrand Russell brings suit to enjoin members of the A.E.C. from testing any more nuclear weapons.

April 9—President Eisenhower tells a news conference that he will appeal to the people for support for his defense reorganization plan.

April 11—The A.E.C. bars U.S. citizens from entering the Pacific atomic proving grounds. The order is aimed at 4 pacifists sailing into the area to protest the bomb tests.

April 16—The Administration sends the defense reorganization bill to Congress without the plan for changing military appropriations procedures.

April 17—President Eisenhower appeals for public support of his reorganization plan for the Defense Department.

April 19—An Air Force Thor explodes on the launching stand.

April 23—Five paratroopers are killed, and 137 wounded in military maneuvers because of weather conditions.

The Air Force fires the first U.S. rocket designed to fly the full 6,325 miles of the intercontinental ballistic missile. The firing appears to be successful.

April 25—The A.E.C. announces that foreign scientists will be allowed to see data on the fission and fusion power of a bomb to be tested by the U.S. this summer.

Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy offers to let the House Armed Services Committee rewrite major portions of the Administration's defense department reorganization bill. This is viewed as a sweeping compromise move.

April 28—A second Vanguard satellite fails to orbit when its third rocket stage does not fire.

Supreme Court

April 7—The Supreme Court sets aside a Federal District Court ruling holding that the Government may constitutionally deprive a man of citizenship because he left the country in wartime to dodge the draft.

The Supreme Court declares that trial judges must explicitly state when their de-

cisions are "final" and consequently subject to appeal.

The Supreme Court rules that the Government's five-year legal proceeding to take gambler Frank Costello's citizenship away must be dismissed for procedural reasons.

April 8—An attack against the Supreme Court as "an instrument of Communist global conquest" is issued as an appendix to hearings of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. The "research report" on the Court was produced by a group called "SPX Research Associates."

April 21—The Senate Judiciary Committee approves two suggestions for limiting the power of the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary.

April 28—The Supreme Court reverses a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit requiring a sharp reduction in Panama Canal tolls. The decision will save the U.S. some \$10 million yearly.

VIETNAM

April 19—It is announced that North Vietnam will begin farm collectivization during the next 3 years.

YUGOSLAVIA

April 7—One of 4 Vice-Presidents of Yugoslavia, Svetozar N. Vukmanovic-Tempo, is appointed president of the Labor Federation's Central Council.

April 19—Marshal Tito's third presidential term opens. It is announced, in the Yugoslav press, that the Soviet Union and the Communist parties of 8 other nations will not attend the seventh congress of the Yugoslav Communist party, because of disagreement with the draft program.

April 22—at the opening session of the seventh congress, Marshal Tito lambasts the Soviet Union for misunderstanding the growth of socialism in Yugoslavia.

April 23—Ambassadors from the Soviet-dominated countries, designated as "observers" at the seventh party congress, walk out when an attack is made upon Moscow's leaders and policies.

April 26—President Tito closes the Yugoslav Communist Party's seventh congress with an appeal to the Soviet Union to discuss any future differences in ideology and policy. He rebukes the Kremlin and its satellites for failing to send delegates to this congress.



"These weapons of ours—strength and unity—need now to be reinforced with alertness and renewed determination. We know our enemy. Unremitting opposition, sparked by clear understanding of his methods and his objectives, can stop the Communist conspirator's march, no matter what tactic he chooses. We can do it, that is, if we do not relax our vigil nor reduce our strength. We could fail, however, if, even for a short time, we were to let down our guard in the mistaken impression the new smiling approach means he no longer seeks to engulf us. We must ever remember that our enemy has not changed. He has given up none of his gains. Examination of his inducements reveals benefits only to himself. He has not abandoned his intention to obliterate our freedom. We therefore cannot for a moment be distracted from the threat of destruction that is aimed at our individual liberties, and at our concept of acceptable civilization."

—Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Freedom from Fear, an address delivered at the Four Freedoms Dinner, April 21, 1958.

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